Section 53 of 55
PART VI — Command, Control, Cybersecurity & Interoperability
Stable section ID: S05-CON-011-SECTION-53 · 303 content blocks
121. Robotic Digital Control Architecture
The Robotic Digital Control Architecture shall separate planning, authorization, execution, protective control, evidence collection, and configuration management.
The architecture may include:
- Building BIOS.
- Engineering Compiler.
- Robotic job planner.
- Fleet coordinator.
- Robot controller.
- Safety controller.
- PLC or machine controller.
- Tool controller.
- Edge services.
- Digital Twin.
- Human approval interface.
- Audit and evidence services.
- Each layer shall have a defined responsibility and authority boundary.
Safety controllers and local protective functions shall remain sufficiently independent from AI planning, cloud services, and productivity optimization.
A higher-level system may request an outcome, but the robot controller shall execute only commands compatible with its active configuration, local limits, work package, and safety state.
No digital subsystem shall silently assume that an issued command produced the intended physical result.
Control architecture shall support deterministic safe behavior during network delay, partial failure, software restart, time disagreement, and inconsistent state.
122. Robot Interface Protocol
System05 shall define an open, version-controlled Robot Interface Protocol for communication among robots, tools, controllers, building systems, and engineering services.
The protocol shall support:
- Identity exchange.
- Capability discovery.
- Configuration verification.
- Work-package transfer.
- Command and acknowledgment.
- State reporting.
- Safety and fault events.
- Evidence submission.
- Pause, resume, abort, and recovery.
- Time synchronization.
- Version and compatibility negotiation.
Every message shall define its units, coordinate system, reference entities, timestamp, sequence, validity period, authority, and expected response.
Commands shall be explicit and bounded. Terms such as “install,” “safe,” “aligned,” or “complete” shall not be used without machine-readable criteria and defined state transitions.
Unknown message types, unsupported versions, missing fields, invalid units, or conflicting coordinate references shall be rejected safely.
The protocol shall distinguish a request, authorization, execution acknowledgment, physical observation, verification, and final acceptance.
- 123. Structured Messages, Commands and State Machines
- Robotic communication shall use structured schemas and formally defined state machines.
A consequential command should include:
- Command identity.
- Issuer identity.
- Target identity.
- Work-package reference.
- Required authority.
- Action and parameters.
- Coordinate frame and units.
- Preconditions.
- Validity interval.
- Sequence dependency.
- Expected outcome.
- Timeout behavior.
- Required acknowledgment.
- Security and integrity information.
State machines shall define valid transitions for robots, tools, tasks, connections, payloads, zones, and approvals.
Invalid transitions shall be rejected rather than silently interpreted. For example, a connection shall not transition directly from “approaching” to “verified for service” without the required intermediate evidence.
Commands should be designed for safe retry and idempotent behavior where practical. Repeated delivery shall not cause repeated fastening, duplicate energization, or uncontrolled motion.
- State disagreement among systems shall create an explicit reconciliation condition.
- 124. Robot Authentication
Every consequential robotic entity shall authenticate before receiving authority, issuing commands, accessing protected data, or submitting trusted evidence.
Authentication may apply to:
- Robots.
- Controllers.
- Tools.
- Edge devices.
- Software services.
- Human operators.
- Manufacturers.
- Inspectors.
- Building systems.
Authentication shall verify the specific active entity and not merely the network location from which it communicates.
Credentials shall be protected against copying, unauthorized extraction, replay, and misuse. Hardware-backed identity may be used where consequence warrants it.
Authentication status shall include issuance, validity, expiration, suspension, revocation, and suspected compromise.
A correctly authenticated robot shall not automatically be considered compatible, safe, certified, or authorized.
Lost, duplicated, revoked, expired, or conflicting credentials shall trigger denial, quarantine, or safe suspension according to consequence.
- 125. Permission and Authority Management
- System05 shall manage robotic authority through explicit, scoped permissions.
Permissions may be limited by:
- Robot or tool identity.
- Task class.
- Work package.
- Component or assembly.
- Site and zone.
- Time period.
- Operating mode.
- Utility state.
- Consequence level.
- Maximum speed, force, or payload.
- Required human supervision.
- Required evidence.
- Authority shall be granted by an identified responsible entity and shall be revocable.
The system shall distinguish permission to observe, plan, simulate, command, execute, inspect, approve, modify configuration, update BIOS records, and energize utilities.
Authority shall expire when its assumptions cease to be true. Changes in component identity, robot configuration, work-zone condition, structural state, software version, or risk classification may invalidate prior authorization.
- Possession of technical capability shall not create permission.
- 126. Least Privilege and Separation of Duties
Every robot, service, person, and software component shall receive only the minimum access necessary for its assigned function.
An inspection robot should not automatically possess authority to alter structural configuration. A planning service should not directly control actuators. A robot submitting evidence should not automatically approve that evidence.
Separation of duties should distinguish among:
- Design and planning.
- Work-package approval.
- Execution.
- Safety supervision.
- Inspection.
- Acceptance.
- Configuration management.
- Software deployment.
- Credential administration.
- Audit review.
- High-consequence actions may require independent approval or multiple authorized roles.
- Temporary privileges shall be time-bounded and automatically removed when no longer required.
Emergency authority shall also remain scoped, logged, and subject to review. An emergency condition shall not create unrestricted access to unrelated systems or data.
127. Command Integrity, Replay Protection and Ordering
Robotic commands shall be protected against alteration, duplication, delay, replay, reordering, and unauthorized substitution.
Protection should include appropriate combinations of:
- Cryptographic integrity.
- Authenticated origin.
- Unique command identifiers.
- Sequence numbers.
- Timestamps.
- Nonces.
- Validity intervals.
- Secure acknowledgments.
- Transaction state.
- Duplicate detection.
The robot shall verify that a command belongs to the current task, configuration, physical state, and authority context.
Delayed commands shall not become valid merely because they were once authorized. A command issued before a pause, tool change, state transition, or emergency stop may require cancellation or reauthorization.
Where an irreversible or high-consequence action is involved, the protocol may require staged preparation, explicit commit, and confirmation of current preconditions.
Acknowledgment of receipt shall remain distinct from acceptance, execution, physical completion, and verification.
128. Robot Controller, PLC and Tool Integration
System05 shall support controlled integration among robot controllers, PLCs, safety controllers, tool controllers, and building automation systems.
Each integration shall define:
- Ownership of each command.
- Active control mode.
- Signal semantics.
- Timing and update rates.
- Units and coordinate references.
- Permitted transitions.
- Fault and timeout behavior.
- Emergency-stop relationships.
- Authority boundaries.
- Evidence responsibilities.
Adapters and gateways may translate protocols but shall not conceal unsupported functions, weaken safety behavior, or invent confirmation.
Native equipment interlocks and protective functions shall not be bypassed for interface convenience.
Where multiple controllers can influence the same actuator or physical resource, control ownership shall be exclusive and visible.
Controller restart, PLC program change, tool replacement, or gateway update shall trigger configuration verification before resumed operation.
129. Local, Edge, Cloud and Offline Operation
Robotic architecture may distribute functions across local controllers, edge systems, cloud services, and offline packages.
Functions requiring immediate physical protection shall remain local enough to meet their response requirements without dependence on remote connectivity.
Cloud services may support:
- Large-scale planning.
- Fleet analytics.
- Software distribution.
- Model training.
- Long-term records.
- Cross-project learning.
- Non-real-time Digital Twin services.
Edge systems may support site coordination, map distribution, work-package management, local analytics, and communication bridging.
Offline operation shall define which tasks remain permitted, which data may be cached, how authority expires, and how records will later be reconciled.
Loss of cloud or external-network access shall not disable local emergency stop, collision protection, payload retention, or other required safety functions.
Reconnection shall include secure synchronization and conflict resolution rather than automatic acceptance of whichever record is newest.
- 130. Robotic Cybersecurity Architecture
- Robotic cybersecurity shall be treated as part of physical safety and engineering integrity.
The architecture shall protect:
- Identity and credentials.
- Commands and work packages.
- Robot and tool configuration.
- Safety parameters.
- Maps and coordinate systems.
- Firmware and software.
- Calibration data.
- Component registries.
- Execution evidence.
- BIOS and Digital Twin interfaces.
- Remote access.
Threat analysis shall consider unauthorized control, malicious modification, credential theft, denial of service, falsified sensor data, corrupted maps, unsafe updates, compromised suppliers, and manipulation of approval workflows.
Networks and systems should be segmented according to function and consequence. Compromise of an occupant service, general IT system, or analytics platform shall not provide uncontrolled access to robotic actuation.
Cybersecurity controls shall include detection, containment, recovery, revocation, incident evidence, and secure restoration.
A suspected cyber incident affecting physical trust shall cause the relevant operation to stop or enter an approved degraded state.
131. Malicious Input and Supply-Chain Protection
Robotic systems shall treat external files, models, packages, components, and updates as potentially untrusted until verified.
Potentially dangerous inputs include:
- BDL documents.
- Robot programs.
- Toolpaths.
- Digital Twin models.
- Maps and markers.
- AI models.
- Capability manifests.
- Calibration files.
- Firmware.
- Third-party libraries.
- Component identity records.
- Work-package templates.
Inputs shall be checked for authenticity, integrity, schema validity, compatibility, authority, and prohibited behavior.
Complex or executable content should be processed in isolated environments before deployment to operational systems.
Software and hardware supply chains should provide traceability for origin, version, dependencies, build process, known vulnerabilities, and approval status.
- A valid signature shall confirm source and integrity but shall not prove engineering correctness or safety.
- Unknown, altered, counterfeit, recalled, or unsupported packages and devices shall be quarantined.
- 132. Secure Update and Configuration Control
Updates to robotic software, firmware, safety parameters, maps, tools, AI models, and configuration shall use a controlled lifecycle.
The process shall include:
- Update identity and source.
- Digital integrity verification.
- Compatibility assessment.
- Change description.
- Safety and engineering impact review.
- Testing and staged deployment.
- Approval.
- Rollback or recovery plan.
- Deployment evidence.
- Post-update verification.
- Production robots shall not accept arbitrary or unreviewed updates.
Configuration baselines shall identify the complete active combination of hardware, software, firmware, tools, calibration, safety settings, and approved capabilities.
An update that changes behavior, stopping performance, perception, localization, tool output, or authority handling may require renewed qualification.
Rollback shall not restore an obsolete version when doing so would introduce a known incompatibility or security risk.
- Update failure shall leave the system in a defined recoverable state.
- 133. Audit Logs and Execution Evidence
Robotic systems shall maintain traceable records sufficient to reconstruct consequential decisions, commands, actions, faults, approvals, and physical outcomes.
Records may include:
- Authenticated identities.
- Active configuration.
- Work-package version.
- Commands and acknowledgments.
- State transitions.
- Safety events.
- Human approvals.
- Sensor and tool data.
- Calibration references.
- Exceptions and retries.
- Manual interventions.
- Software and configuration changes.
- Completion and inspection evidence.
- Logs shall use synchronized and traceable time references where sequence matters.
Audit records should be tamper-evident and protected according to their consequence, privacy, and retention requirements.
Operational logs shall remain distinguishable from engineering evidence. Large quantities of raw data shall not substitute for the specific evidence required to accept a physical outcome.
Missing, corrupted, disputed, or incomplete records shall remain visible.
A robotic system shall not be permitted to delete or rewrite evidence merely because the evidence indicates failure.
134. Privacy and Robotic Data Governance
Robotic data collection shall be limited to legitimate safety, execution, maintenance, evidence, and improvement needs.
Particular protection shall apply to data from occupied buildings, including:
- Images and video.
- Audio.
- Occupant presence and movement.
- Personal identity.
- Building access patterns.
- Interior maps.
- Security systems.
- Utility-use information.
- Sensitive objects or activities observed incidentally.
Data governance shall define purpose, ownership, access, retention, sharing, anonymization, deletion, and legal authority.
- Safety monitoring shall not become unrestricted surveillance.
- Where practical, data should be processed locally, minimized, filtered, or anonymized before broader use.
Use of operational data for model training, commercial analytics, or unrelated research shall require separate authority from the authority to perform the robotic task.
- Emergency access to data shall be limited to the emergency need and subsequently reviewed.
- 135. Interoperability, Compatibility and Versioning
System05 robotic interfaces shall support multiple manufacturers, robot classes, tools, controllers, and software platforms without requiring dependence on a single vendor.
Interoperability shall be based on explicit specifications for:
- Physical interfaces.
- Coordinate systems.
- Message schemas.
- State machines.
- Capabilities.
- Safety behavior.
- Evidence formats.
- Authentication.
- Error handling.
- Version negotiation.
- Compatibility shall be evaluated for the complete active configuration, not merely for individual products.
Versions shall distinguish backward-compatible extensions, behavior-changing revisions, experimental functions, and incompatible changes.
A receiving system shall identify which functions it supports and reject unsupported mandatory behavior.
Adapters may provide compatibility when their translation limits, safety effects, and evidence behavior are defined and certified where required.
- Silent fallback to an older, less safe, or semantically different behavior shall be prohibited.
- 136. Robotics SDK, APIs and Package Architecture
System05 shall provide governed SDKs, APIs, schemas, reference packages, and development tools that enable independent creation of compatible robotic solutions.
The Robotics SDK may include:
- Identity and authentication libraries.
- Interface Protocol schemas.
- Capability Manifest templates.
- Task and work-package models.
- Coordinate-system utilities.
- State-machine definitions.
- Simulation interfaces.
- Evidence-generation tools.
- Error and recovery models.
- Test fixtures.
- Conformance suites.
- Reference implementations.
Packages shall declare:
- Identity and publisher.
- Version.
- Dependencies.
- Supported platforms.
- Required permissions.
- Compatibility profiles.
- Safety classification.
- Configuration requirements.
- Known limitations.
- Integrity information.
Third-party extensions shall operate within declared permissions and shall not bypass safety controllers, protected BIOS functions, or authority boundaries.
Reference implementations shall demonstrate protocol behavior but shall not automatically constitute certification for every physical application.
SDK evolution shall preserve stable interfaces wherever practical and provide explicit migration paths when change is necessary.
The objective of the Robotics SDK shall be to create an open development ecosystem while preserving deterministic behavior, physical safety, cybersecurity, evidence integrity, and accountable engineering authority.