Section 45 of 55
92. System-Level Safety Architecture
Stable section ID: S05-CON-011-SECTION-45 · 25 content blocks
Every consequential robotic deployment shall define a System-Level Safety Architecture covering equipment, tasks, work zones, temporary structural states, human interaction, utilities, communications, and failure recovery.
The architecture should distinguish among:
- Inherently safe mechanical design.
- Operational control functions.
- Independent protective functions.
- Emergency functions.
- Human supervision.
- Administrative controls.
- Physical inspection and acceptance.
- Cybersecurity controls affecting physical safety.
Safety-related functions shall be sufficiently independent from ordinary optimization and production systems. Failure of a planner, AI model, fleet coordinator, Digital Twin, or cloud service shall not disable the protective functions necessary to prevent injury or uncontrolled physical action.
The architecture shall identify:
- Safety boundaries.
- Controlled entities.
- Hazardous energy sources.
- Safe and unsafe states.
- Required response times.
- Stopping and holding behavior.
- Redundancy and diagnostic coverage.
- Common-mode failure risks.
- Authority for reset and restart.
- Required inspection and testing.
- Interfaces with site emergency procedures.
System-level validation shall evaluate the actual robot–tool–payload–site configuration. Certification of an individual robot or tool shall not automatically establish the safety of the integrated operation.
Changes to payload, tooling, software, work-zone geometry, structural sequence, operating mode, or environmental condition shall be assessed for their effect on the safety architecture.