# S05-CON-006: Building BIOS Architecture

Source title: PART I — Building BIOS Foundations
Source status: Status undeclared
Version: Undeclared
SHA-256: ea697eeb99641705b131aeba1f198700664e81e4ef555119ea23a2438eddfc51

## Document opening

PART I — Building BIOS Foundations

## 1. Introduction

A System05 building is composed of structural Nodes, physical Interfaces, Cartridges, utility systems, sensors, controllers, software services, human-access systems, robotic-access features, and external infrastructure. These elements may originate from different manufacturers, operate through different technologies, and change repeatedly throughout the building lifecycle.

Physical compatibility alone cannot coordinate such a system. The building requires an authoritative mechanism capable of determining:

which components are physically present;

where each component is installed;

which Interfaces are connected;

which capabilities are available;

which configurations are approved;

which dependencies exist;

which components are permitted to operate;

which faults or restrictions are active;

how the building can enter a safe state;

how configuration changes are recorded.

The System05 Building BIOS provides this foundational coordination layer.

The Building BIOS establishes a persistent relationship between the physical building and its verified digital configuration. It initializes the building’s essential digital infrastructure, discovers and authenticates components, validates compatibility, constructs the building topology, applies approved Engineering Profiles, manages configuration and state, records events, and exposes controlled services to higher-level systems.

The Building BIOS shall be local-first. Essential identity, configuration, safety, diagnostic, and recovery functions shall remain available within the building even when external networks, cloud services, AI services, manufacturer servers, or remote management platforms are unavailable.

The BIOS shall not replace structural engineering, electrical protection, mechanical safety devices, fire-protection systems, qualified engineering judgment, or legally required controls. It coordinates and verifies these systems but shall not create unsafe dependence upon software for functions that require independent physical protection.

The Building BIOS shall provide a stable platform layer across multiple generations of Cartridges, equipment, automation systems, Digital Twins, AI services, and robotic technologies. Higher-level systems may evolve independently while continuing to access the building through controlled BIOS services and authoritative configuration records.

## 2. Definition of Building BIOS

The System05 Building BIOS is the building’s authoritative, local, persistent, vendor-neutral initialization, identity, configuration, state-coordination, trust, and recovery layer.

It is responsible for establishing the minimum verified digital condition required before connected building components and higher-level services may participate in building operation.

The Building BIOS consists of:

a BIOS Core;

trusted identity and security services;

a Hardware and Cartridge Abstraction Layer;

an Interface Abstraction Layer;

a Configuration Engine;

a State Engine;

an Event Engine;

a Policy and Rules Engine;

a Service Manager;

persistent configuration and event storage;

controlled external APIs;

backup and recovery mechanisms.

The BIOS maintains an authoritative representation of:

the building identity;

installed component and Cartridge identities;

physical and logical locations;

available and occupied Interfaces;

connection relationships;

component capabilities;

operating limitations;

dependencies;

selected Engineering Profiles;

configuration versions;

operational and lifecycle states;

active faults, restrictions, and overrides.

The Building BIOS is not equivalent to:

a conventional computer firmware BIOS;

an operating system kernel;

a Building Management System;

a home-automation platform;

a Digital Twin;

an AI assistant;

a cloud service;

a design model;

a direct replacement for safety controllers.

The term “BIOS” describes its foundational role: it establishes identity, verifies the basic system configuration, initializes essential services, confirms that required dependencies are satisfied, and provides a trusted base upon which higher-level building intelligence can operate.

## 3. Purpose of Building BIOS

The primary purpose of Building BIOS is to ensure that the building can identify, validate, coordinate, and understand its own installed configuration.

The BIOS shall provide a single authoritative answer to fundamental configuration questions:

What building is this?

Which components and Cartridges belong to it?

Where is each component located?

Which Interfaces are connected?

Is each connection compatible and commissioned?

Which capabilities can each component provide?

Which services does each component require?

What is the approved configuration?

What has changed since commissioning?

What faults, restrictions, or maintenance conditions exist?

Which systems depend upon a component before it is isolated or removed?

What configuration can be restored after failure?

The BIOS enables controlled modularity. Replaceability becomes reliable only when the building can recognize the removed component, evaluate the replacement, validate the new connection, update the topology, and preserve the lifecycle record.

The BIOS also provides the stable coordination layer required for:

multi-manufacturer interoperability;

commissioning;

configuration control;

Digital Twin accuracy;

AI access to verified building information;

robotic installation and inspection;

fault diagnosis;

maintenance planning;

emergency response;

building upgrades;

long-term technological evolution.

The BIOS shall reduce dependence upon undocumented site knowledge, proprietary installer memory, disconnected drawings, and obsolete manufacturer software.

## 4. BIOS Philosophy

The Building BIOS Philosophy is founded upon the principle that a building shall know its verified configuration before it permits intelligent operation.

The BIOS shall be:

Local-first: essential functions remain available within the building.

Vendor-neutral: no single manufacturer controls universal building configuration.

Configuration-authoritative: approved configuration is distinguishable from observed or requested configuration.

Interface-based: components are coordinated through declared Interfaces and capabilities.

Deterministic at the core: identical verified inputs and rules produce predictable decisions.

Human-accountable: safety-critical configuration changes remain attributable to authorized persons or institutions.

Machine-readable: robots, software, AI, and engineering tools can interpret configuration without relying on unstructured documents.

Recoverable: configuration and essential records can be restored after equipment or power failure.

Traceable: changes, commands, states, faults, and overrides produce persistent records.

Replaceable: the BIOS implementation can migrate to new hardware without losing the building’s identity or history.

Extensible: new component classes and services can be added without redesigning the constitutional architecture.

Fail-safe: uncertainty, inconsistency, or loss of trust results in restricted behavior rather than uncontrolled activation.

The BIOS shall prefer verified evidence over assumption. Physical presence shall not imply compatibility. Network connectivity shall not imply authorization. A command shall not imply successful physical action. A digital model shall not imply that the corresponding physical configuration exists.

The BIOS shall maintain explicit separation among:

what was designed;

what was manufactured;

what was installed;

what was commissioned;

what is currently observed;

what is currently authorized;

what is requested;

what is predicted.

## 5. Constitutional Principles

Every System05 Building BIOS implementation shall comply with the following principles.

Persistent Building Identity Every building shall possess a unique identity independent of a particular BIOS device, cloud account, owner, software vendor, or service provider.

Authoritative Configuration The BIOS shall maintain an approved configuration baseline and shall identify deviations from that baseline.

Verified Participation A component shall not receive operational authority solely because it is physically or digitally connected.

Least Authority Each user, service, Cartridge, controller, robot, or AI agent shall receive only the permissions required for its declared function.

Local Essential Operation Loss of external communication shall not eliminate essential identity, configuration, safety-state, emergency-information, or recovery functions.

Physical Safety Independence Critical physical protection shall not depend exclusively upon the availability of general-purpose BIOS software.

Traceable Change Every accepted configuration change shall identify who or what initiated it, what changed, why it changed, which evidence supported it, and which configuration resulted.

Explicit State Operational, lifecycle, fault, maintenance, isolation, and emergency states shall be formally defined.

Actual-State Verification The BIOS shall distinguish commanded state from verified physical state.

Fail-Safe Uncertainty Unknown identity, incompatible configuration, corrupted data, or unresolved state conflict shall prevent unsafe activation.

Multi-Manufacturer Interoperability The BIOS shall coordinate compliant products without requiring proprietary control by a competing manufacturer.

Technology Neutrality The constitutional BIOS architecture shall not depend upon a single processor, operating system, network, database, or cloud platform.

Recoverability Failure of the active BIOS hardware shall not permanently destroy the building’s identity, configuration, or essential lifecycle records.

Lifecycle Continuity Building records shall remain usable through ownership changes, equipment replacement, renovation, software migration, and decommissioning.

## 6. BIOS Scope

The Building BIOS scope includes the foundational digital coordination of the building and its registered engineering assets.

In scope are:

building identity;

BIOS identity and version;

trusted boot and system integrity;

component and Cartridge discovery;

identity verification;

enrollment and registration;

Interface discovery;

compatibility verification;

capability negotiation;

topology construction;

spatial and dependency mapping;

Engineering Profile selection;

configuration validation;

configuration baselines;

configuration versioning;

state and event management;

service initialization;

health and diagnostic coordination;

fault and restriction records;

user, service, robot, and AI permissions;

controlled access to building information;

backup, restore, and recovery;

integration with Digital Twin, BMS, AI, robotics, and external systems.

The BIOS may coordinate but does not necessarily execute:

room temperature control;

lighting schedules;

appliance behavior;

occupant automation;

energy optimization;

predictive analytics;

AI decision-making;

detailed robotic motion planning;

engineering design calculations;

long-term cloud analytics.

Such functions normally belong to higher-level systems operating through BIOS-authorized interfaces.

The BIOS scope shall extend to passive components where their identity, condition, structural role, location, or lifecycle history is important, even if they have no electronic communication capability.

## 7. BIOS Responsibilities

The Building BIOS shall be responsible for maintaining the foundational digital integrity of the building configuration.

Its mandatory responsibilities include:

establishing and preserving the building’s unique identity;

verifying the integrity and authorized version of the BIOS;

initializing essential local services;

discovering connected components, Cartridges, and Interfaces;

authenticating identities where required;

retrieving or storing applicable Interface Descriptors and Digital Passports;

determining whether proposed connections are compatible;

constructing and maintaining the building topology;

recording physical, logical, spatial, and dependency relationships;

validating configuration against approved rules and Engineering Profiles;

authorizing or rejecting component activation;

tracking lifecycle and operational states;

recording configuration changes and significant events;

identifying configuration drift;

supporting diagnostics and fault containment;

controlling access to BIOS data and services;

providing authoritative information to higher-level systems;

preserving backup and recovery data;

supporting controlled replacement and upgrade;

maintaining essential emergency information.

The BIOS shall also identify where responsibility belongs elsewhere. It shall not falsely represent a monitored condition as physically protected if the required independent safety device is absent.

When BIOS responsibility is delegated to another service or controller, the delegation shall specify:

delegated function;

receiving identity;

authority limits;

validity period;

required state;

revocation conditions;

reporting requirements.

## 8. BIOS Boundaries

The Building BIOS boundary defines what the BIOS controls directly, what it coordinates, and what remains under the authority of other systems.

The BIOS controls directly:

its own trusted startup;

its authoritative configuration records;

component enrollment;

access permissions;

configuration validation;

state and event records;

service activation;

API access;

configuration backup and recovery.

The BIOS coordinates but does not automatically replace:

structural safety systems;

electrical protective devices;

mechanical interlocks;

fire-alarm control units;

pressure-relief systems;

certified safety controllers;

Building Management Systems;

home-automation systems;

robotic controllers;

Digital Twin platforms;

AI services.

The BIOS may authorize a higher-level system to issue commands, but the receiving physical controller remains responsible for executing those commands within its certified limits.

The BIOS shall not perform project-specific engineering design simply because it possesses configuration data. Engineering Compiler or AI services may analyze proposed configurations, but final authority shall follow the project’s engineering and regulatory requirements.

The BIOS shall not claim that the Digital Twin is synchronized unless required physical verification has occurred.

Cloud services may extend storage, analytics, remote support, and collaboration, but shall not become the sole holder of essential building identity or recovery information.

Manufacturer services may support their products, but shall not receive unrestricted access to unrelated building systems.

## 9. Minimum Building BIOS Requirements

Every System05 Building BIOS implementation shall provide the following minimum capabilities.

Building Identity

create or import a unique Building ID;

protect continuity of the Building ID during hardware migration;

expose the Building ID to authorized systems.

Local Persistence

store the approved configuration baseline locally;

preserve essential records through normal power loss;

support validated backup and restoration.

Component Registry

register active and passive components;

distinguish Type Identity from Instance Identity;

record location, version, status, and host relationship.

Interface Registry

identify available, occupied, isolated, faulted, and decommissioned Interfaces;

store Interface Type, version, Compatibility Class, and connection relationship.

Configuration Management

maintain declared, approved, observed, and requested configurations separately;

validate proposed changes;

record accepted configuration changes;

detect unresolved configuration drift.

State Management

maintain defined component, Interface, Cartridge, and building states;

distinguish commanded state from observed state;

prevent prohibited state transitions.

Event Recording

record startup, shutdown, connection, commissioning, fault, isolation, override, maintenance, and configuration events;

preserve event provenance and timestamps.

Security

verify BIOS integrity;

authenticate protected components and services;

enforce role-based or capability-based authorization;

protect configuration and credentials.

Offline Operation

provide essential BIOS services without cloud connectivity;

retain local emergency and recovery information.

Recovery

support safe boot;

support recovery from corrupted or incompatible configuration;

restore the last known valid configuration where permitted.

Interoperability

expose documented, versioned, vendor-neutral interfaces;

support registered System05 components from independent manufacturers.

Human Access

provide an authorized local method for viewing building identity, BIOS state, critical faults, connected components, emergency information, and recovery status.

## PART II — Building BIOS Architecture

10. Universal Building BIOS Model

The Universal Building BIOS Model consists of five principal entities:

Physical Building The structural, mechanical, electrical, fluid, environmental, and spatial systems.

Registered Engineering Assets Nodes, Interfaces, Cartridges, equipment, sensors, controllers, and passive components represented within the BIOS.

BIOS Core Services Identity, configuration, state, event, policy, security, storage, and recovery services.

Higher-Level Systems Building Management Systems, home automation, Digital Twins, AI agents, engineering applications, and robotic systems.

Human Authorities Owners, occupants, engineers, installers, inspectors, maintainers, emergency responders, manufacturers, and administrators.

The BIOS receives:

identity records;

Digital Interface Descriptors;

Cartridge Digital Passports;

physical observations;

commissioning evidence;

sensor states;

configuration requests;

Engineering Profiles;

user and service commands;

higher-level system requests.

The BIOS produces:

verified topology;

approved configuration;

compatibility decisions;

authorized service access;

state and event records;

configuration-change records;

diagnostic information;

fault and restriction status;

recovery data;

controlled APIs.

The authoritative BIOS configuration shall be represented as a versioned graph of entities and relationships rather than merely as a list of devices.

Each registered entity shall have:

identity;

type;

version;

location;

interfaces;

capabilities;

requirements;

state;

dependencies;

permissions;

evidence;

lifecycle status.

Each relationship shall identify:

participating entities;

relationship type;

direction;

Interface IDs;

current status;

effective configuration version;

applicable evidence.

## 11. Layered Architecture

The Building BIOS shall use a layered architecture to separate physical interaction, configuration logic, security, services, and external integration.

The architectural layers are:

Physical Infrastructure Layer BIOS hardware, controllers, networks, power supplies, local storage, sensors, and physical communication media.

Trusted Platform Layer Hardware identity, secure boot, cryptographic operations, integrity verification, protected credentials, and recovery authority.

Hardware and Cartridge Abstraction Layer Normalized representation of different manufacturers’ components and physical devices.

Interface Abstraction Layer Representation of physical, structural, electrical, fluid, thermal, digital, human, robotic, and safety Interfaces.

BIOS Core Layer Identity, configuration, state, event, policy, service management, time, context, persistence, and coordination.

Building Service Layer Diagnostics, commissioning, health, resource availability, lifecycle support, and controlled operational services.

Integration Layer APIs and adapters connecting the BIOS to Digital Twins, AI, BMS, robotics, engineering tools, and approved external services.

Human Interaction Layer Local and remote interfaces for authorized viewing, configuration, maintenance, recovery, and emergency access.

A higher layer shall not bypass the permissions and validation rules of a lower foundational layer.

Hardware-specific behavior shall be isolated within the abstraction layer so that replacement of a controller or manufacturer-specific driver does not require redesign of the complete BIOS.

Safety-critical local controls may operate parallel to the general BIOS layers where independence is required. Their status and configuration shall still be represented within the BIOS when technically possible.

## 12. Physical Deployment Architecture

The Building BIOS shall operate on one or more local computing devices physically associated with the building.

A BIOS computing unit may include:

processor;

protected boot memory;

working memory;

persistent storage;

hardware identity or security module;

real-time clock;

network interfaces;

local service interface;

power-failure detection;

backup or controlled shutdown power;

environmental monitoring;

watchdog mechanism.

The physical deployment shall account for:

building size;

number of registered components;

required event volume;

safety and availability requirements;

network topology;

environmental exposure;

service access;

expected lifecycle;

replacement and upgrade.

The BIOS unit shall be installed in a defined, accessible, protected location. Its identity, power source, network connections, environmental limits, and replacement procedure shall be documented.

Essential configuration storage shall not reside exclusively on removable consumer media or an unprotected general-purpose computer.

Power interruption shall not corrupt the approved configuration. The BIOS shall either maintain sufficient temporary power for controlled shutdown or use storage architecture capable of preserving transactional integrity during sudden power loss.

At least one authorized local service path shall exist. Recovery shall not depend solely upon internet access, a manufacturer account, or a mobile application that may become unavailable.

For larger buildings, physical BIOS functions may be distributed across zone controllers, gateway devices, safety controllers, and a coordinating core. Ownership of authoritative data shall remain explicit.

## 13. Centralized and Distributed BIOS Models

System05 shall support centralized, distributed, and hybrid BIOS deployments.

In a Centralized BIOS Model, one primary BIOS unit maintains the authoritative configuration and coordinates connected building systems.

This model may be suitable for:

small residential buildings;

limited numbers of Cartridges;

simple topology;

low availability requirements;

cost-sensitive implementation.

A centralized system shall address the risk of a single hardware failure through backup, recoverable storage, replaceable hardware, or a standby unit appropriate to the building profile.

In a Distributed BIOS Model, multiple BIOS nodes coordinate different physical zones, disciplines, or functions.

A distributed deployment may include:

building-level coordinator;

floor or zone BIOS nodes;

structural monitoring node;

utility coordination nodes;

safety-system gateways;

local Cartridge gateways.

Distributed nodes shall have unique identities and declared authority. They shall not maintain conflicting authoritative versions of the same configuration object without a defined conflict-resolution process.

In a Hybrid BIOS Model, an authoritative building-level configuration is coordinated centrally while time-sensitive, zone-specific, or resilience-critical services operate locally.

The selected deployment shall define:

authoritative configuration owner;

replicated data;

local autonomy;

synchronization requirements;

behavior during network partition;

failover procedure;

recovery authority;

conflict resolution.

No deployment shall permit two controllers to issue contradictory safety-critical authority because of an unresolved coordination failure.

## 14. BIOS Core

The BIOS Core is the minimum trusted software and service assembly responsible for maintaining building identity, authoritative configuration, state coordination, access control, and recovery.

The BIOS Core shall initialize before nonessential building applications.

Its primary modules shall include:

Identity Manager;

Trust and Integrity Manager;

Registry Manager;

Configuration Engine;

State Engine;

Event Engine;

Policy and Rules Engine;

Service Manager;

Storage Manager;

Time and Context Manager;

Recovery Manager;

API Access Manager.

The BIOS Core shall remain as small and stable as practical. High-level analytics, occupant applications, visualization, optimization, and AI models should operate outside the trusted core.

The Core shall expose explicit internal service contracts. Modules shall not alter another module’s authoritative records through undocumented direct access.

Core operations affecting configuration shall be transactional. A proposed change shall either complete with all required validations and records or return the BIOS to the preceding valid state.

The BIOS Core shall provide a health status including:

software integrity;

configuration integrity;

storage condition;

clock validity;

communication status;

active faults;

redundancy state;

backup status;

recovery readiness.

Core failure shall result in a defined restricted or recovery condition. It shall not silently leave higher-level systems operating with uncertain configuration authority.

## 15. Hardware & Cartridge Abstraction Layer

The Hardware and Cartridge Abstraction Layer, or HCAL, converts manufacturer-specific physical devices and Cartridges into standardized BIOS objects.

HCAL shall allow the BIOS Core to interact with components according to declared capabilities rather than proprietary implementation details.

Each HCAL object shall expose, as applicable:

Type and Instance Identity;

manufacturer and version;

component class;

interfaces;

capabilities;

requirements;

current observed state;

supported commands;

diagnostic information;

fault status;

lifecycle data;

communication status.

Manufacturer-specific drivers or connectors shall operate below the standardized HCAL contract.

HCAL shall distinguish among:

active electronically connected components;

passive components identified by scanning or registration;

legacy devices represented through adapters;

simulated or design-stage objects;

temporarily unavailable objects;

removed or decommissioned objects.

A driver shall not be permitted to create capabilities that are absent from the registered Cartridge or component definition.

Where a manufacturer-specific value is translated into a System05 value, the translation shall define:

source value;

destination value;

unit conversion;

precision;

uncertainty;

update rate;

invalid-data behavior.

Driver failure shall not corrupt the authoritative building configuration. The affected object shall transition to an unavailable, degraded, or faulted state.

## 16. Interface Abstraction Layer

The Interface Abstraction Layer, or IAL, represents every registered System05 Interface through a common BIOS object model.

Each Interface object shall include:

Interface Type ID;

Interface Instance ID;

domain classification;

version;

Compatibility Class;

host component;

physical or logical location;

coordinate reference;

connected Interface, if any;

connection state;

Capability Declaration;

negotiated limits;

safety classification;

inspection status;

active faults;

applicable Interface Profile.

The IAL shall represent both sides of a connection independently. This permits the BIOS to detect situations in which one side reports Connected while the other side reports Disconnected, Faulted, or Unknown.

The IAL shall support interfaces that are:

physical;

structural;

mechanical;

electrical;

fluid;

thermal;

data;

control;

human;

robotic;

safety-related;

multi-domain.

The abstraction shall define standard operations such as:

discover;

identify;

verify;

reserve;

align;

engage;

lock;

commission;

activate;

isolate;

release;

disconnect;

inspect.

Not every Interface shall implement every operation. Unsupported operations shall be explicitly declared.

Commands passing through the IAL shall be validated against identity, state, authority, compatibility, and safety conditions before execution.

## 17. Configuration Engine

The Configuration Engine maintains, validates, compares, and changes the authoritative building configuration.

It shall manage four distinct configuration views:

Declared Configuration: information supplied by manufacturers, designers, or registered components;

Approved Configuration: configuration formally authorized for the building;

Observed Configuration: configuration detected or verified in the physical building;

Requested Configuration: proposed future change awaiting validation or implementation.

The Engine shall prevent these views from being silently merged.

A configuration object shall identify:

object identity;

object type and version;

location;

interfaces;

relationships;

capabilities;

dependencies;

selected Profiles;

permissions;

approved limits;

evidence;

effective date;

authorizing authority.

A configuration change shall follow:

submission;

identity and authority check;

schema validation;

compatibility validation;

dependency analysis;

policy evaluation;

safety and Engineering Profile validation;

impact assessment;

approval;

transactional application;

physical verification where required;

baseline update;

event recording.

Rejected changes shall include a machine-readable and human-readable explanation.

The Configuration Engine shall support rollback only when the previous physical and digital conditions remain achievable and safe. A digital rollback shall not falsely represent reversal of an irreversible physical change.

## 18. State Engine

The State Engine maintains the current state of BIOS services, components, Interfaces, Cartridges, building zones, and the building as a whole.

The State Engine shall distinguish among:

declared state;

commanded state;

observed state;

verified state;

inferred state;

desired state.

Each state record shall identify:

subject identity;

state type;

state value;

source;

timestamp;

confidence or verification level;

applicable configuration version;

expiration or validity conditions;

related event.

State transitions shall be governed by explicit rules. A component shall not enter Operational state directly from Disconnected state without completing the required intermediate states.

State conflicts shall be detected when:

different sources report incompatible conditions;

commanded state differs from physical feedback;

a component state conflicts with its Interface state;

a dependent system is active while its required service is unavailable;

the Digital Twin differs from verified physical configuration.

The Engine shall not resolve safety-relevant conflicts through arbitrary source priority. It shall apply the approved policy, restrict operation where necessary, and request verification.

Historical states shall remain available for diagnostics and lifecycle analysis.

## 19. Event Engine

The Event Engine receives, validates, sequences, stores, and distributes significant occurrences affecting the building configuration or operation.

An event shall contain:

Event ID;

event type;

source identity;

subject identity;

timestamp;

location;

preceding state;

resulting state;

configuration version;

relevant values;

severity;

evidence reference;

required acknowledgment;

retention classification.

Event categories shall include:

identity;

discovery;

connection;

configuration;

state transition;

operation;

fault;

alarm;

safety;

security;

maintenance;

inspection;

override;

software update;

recovery;

decommissioning.

The Event Engine shall distinguish:

requested action;

command issued;

command accepted;

physical action detected;

physical result verified;

action failed.

Events shall be processed without permitting one malfunctioning device to overwhelm critical BIOS services. Rate limits, prioritization, buffering, and fault isolation shall be applied according to event class.

Safety and security events shall receive higher processing and retention priority than routine telemetry.

When reliable time is unavailable, events shall retain local sequence information and shall be reconciled after time synchronization is restored.

Accepted event records shall be append-only. Corrections shall be implemented through linked superseding events.

## 20. Policy & Rules Engine

The Policy and Rules Engine evaluates whether proposed actions, configurations, permissions, and state transitions are permitted.

Rules may originate from:

System05 constitutional requirements;

Interface Specifications;

Cartridge requirements;

Engineering Profiles;

regulatory requirements;

project engineering decisions;

owner policies;

operational settings;

emergency procedures.

The hierarchy of authority shall be explicit. A lower-level convenience rule shall not override a higher-level safety, regulatory, or engineering restriction.

Each rule shall identify:

Rule ID;

source authority;

version;

applicable entities;

triggering condition;

required inputs;

decision logic;

permitted action;

prohibited action;

exception authority;

effective period;

evidence requirement.

The Rules Engine shall produce deterministic decisions for identical verified inputs. AI-generated recommendations shall not be inserted as authoritative rules without review, versioning, and approval.

Rule conflicts shall produce an explicit conflict state. Safety-preserving restriction shall apply until the conflict is resolved.

Examples of BIOS policy decisions include:

whether an uncommissioned Cartridge may receive power;

whether a replacement Cartridge satisfies the required capacity;

whether a maintenance user may release a lock;

whether a remote service may issue a command;

whether an update may proceed during emergency operation;

whether a degraded component may remain temporarily operational.

All safety-relevant rule decisions shall be auditable.

## 21. Service Manager

The Service Manager controls initialization, dependency resolution, health monitoring, suspension, restart, and shutdown of BIOS services.

Every BIOS service shall declare:

Service ID;

version;

purpose;

dependencies;

required permissions;

required resources;

startup conditions;

health-check method;

failure behavior;

restart policy;

shutdown sequence.

Services shall be grouped by criticality:

essential BIOS services;

safety-supporting services;

operational services;

diagnostic services;

optional services;

external integration services.

The Service Manager shall start services in dependency order. A service shall not enter Active state when a required dependency is unavailable or unverified.

Failure of an optional service shall not stop essential BIOS operation. Failure of a critical service shall place dependent functions into defined degraded, isolated, or recovery states.

Automatic restart shall be limited where repeated failure could conceal a persistent defect or create unsafe oscillation.

Third-party services shall execute with restricted permissions and shall not receive direct access to BIOS Core storage unless explicitly authorized.

Service installation, removal, update, activation, and failure shall generate auditable events.

## 22. Persistent Storage

Persistent Storage preserves authoritative BIOS information across shutdown, power loss, hardware replacement, and software migration.

The storage architecture shall maintain:

building identity;

BIOS identity and version;

configuration baselines;

component and Interface registries;

topology and dependency maps;

Engineering Profiles;

authorization records;

state checkpoints;

event and audit logs;

fault and maintenance records;

Digital Passport references;

recovery data;

cryptographic trust records.

Data shall be classified by:

criticality;

confidentiality;

retention period;

mutability;

required redundancy;

local availability;

recovery priority.

Authoritative configuration changes shall use transactional storage. An interrupted write shall not leave the building with a partially applied baseline.

Integrity checking shall detect corruption, unauthorized modification, incomplete migration, and inconsistent replicas.

Backups shall be:

encrypted where appropriate;

versioned;

periodically verified;

separated from the primary storage failure domain;

restorable without dependence upon a single vendor.

Essential configuration shall use documented, exportable formats. Proprietary storage implementation may be used internally but shall not prevent authorized migration.

Storage limits shall not cause silent deletion of safety, security, configuration, certification, or lifecycle records. Retention and archival policies shall be explicit.

## 23. Time, Location & Context Services

The BIOS shall provide authoritative time, location, and operational context to components and higher-level services.

The Time Service shall provide:

current time;

timezone;

synchronization status;

time source;

accuracy estimate;

monotonic sequence reference;

daylight-saving handling where applicable.

A loss or correction of wall-clock time shall not reverse event ordering. Safety-critical durations shall use monotonic time sources where possible.

The Location Service shall maintain hierarchical building locations such as:

site;

building;

level;

zone;

room;

structural grid;

Node;

Interface;

Cartridge position.

Location shall distinguish designed position from verified installed position.

The Context Service may represent:

normal occupancy;

unoccupied condition;

construction;

commissioning;

maintenance;

emergency;

fire response;

power outage;

network isolation;

severe weather;

partial building shutdown.

Context shall affect permissions and operating policies only through approved rules.

Location and context data derived from inference shall be identified as inferred. Privacy-sensitive occupant context shall be minimized, protected, and separated from basic engineering configuration where possible.

## 24. Redundancy & Coordination

The Building BIOS shall provide redundancy proportional to the building’s scale, complexity, criticality, and required availability.

Redundancy may apply to:

power supply;

BIOS computing units;

persistent storage;

communication paths;

clocks;

network gateways;

configuration replicas;

safety-status reporting;

recovery interfaces.

The architecture shall define:

primary and standby roles;

authority transfer;

failure detection;

failover conditions;

synchronization;

recovery;

reintegration;

conflict resolution.

A standby BIOS shall not assume authority without verifying the validity and recency of its configuration.

Distributed BIOS nodes shall coordinate through explicit ownership of configuration objects and services. Where authority is replicated, the system shall prevent split-brain operation in which multiple nodes issue conflicting authoritative decisions.

During communication partition, local BIOS nodes may continue preauthorized functions within defined limits. They shall not approve configuration changes requiring unavailable building-level authority.

After reconnection, records shall be reconciled without deleting conflicting events. Physical state shall be reverified where digital records cannot establish the actual condition.

Redundancy shall not create common-mode failure through identical unprotected power, network, location, software, or credential dependencies.

Small buildings may use a single active BIOS device if their Engineering Profile provides an appropriate verified backup and replacement strategy. High-criticality buildings may require physically separated redundant BIOS nodes and independent recovery paths.

## PART III — Boot, Discovery & Activation

25. Building Boot Philosophy

Building Boot is the controlled process through which the Building BIOS establishes a trusted, verified, and operational representation of the building after initial installation, shutdown, power restoration, software restart, hardware replacement, or recovery.

A building does not boot in the same manner as a single computer. Many physical systems may remain mechanically, structurally, hydraulically, electrically, or locally operational while the BIOS is unavailable. The boot process shall therefore determine which physical conditions already exist before it authorizes digital coordination or higher-level control.

The BIOS shall never assume that the physical building remained unchanged during its downtime. It shall compare the last approved configuration with the currently observed configuration.

Building Boot shall proceed from the lowest-trust condition toward progressively higher levels of authorization:

BIOS hardware integrity;

BIOS software integrity;

persistent storage integrity;

essential service availability;

network and communication availability;

component and Interface discovery;

identity verification;

topology reconstruction;

configuration validation;

state reconciliation;

service commissioning;

operational authorization.

The boot process shall distinguish between:

first boot of a new building;

normal restart;

restart after power failure;

restart after configuration change;

restart after BIOS update;

restart after hardware migration;

recovery boot;

emergency restart;

partial zone restart.

Boot completion shall not require every optional component to be available. It shall require all components and services necessary for the selected building operating mode.

The BIOS shall support partial and degraded operation when noncritical systems are unavailable, provided that dependencies, restrictions, and safety requirements are satisfied.

## 26. Power-On and Restart Sequence

The Power-On and Restart Sequence shall initialize the BIOS without unexpectedly activating physical equipment.

The general sequence shall be:

Power Stabilization Verify that the BIOS power source is within acceptable voltage, frequency, and quality limits.

Processor and Memory Initialization Initialize the BIOS computing platform and verify basic hardware availability.

Hardware Root-of-Trust Initialization Activate protected identity, cryptographic, and integrity-verification functions.

Secure Boot Verification Verify each authorized software stage before execution.

Persistent Storage Mounting Access configuration and recovery records in read-only or protected mode until integrity is confirmed.

Core Self-Test Test processor, memory, storage, time source, watchdog, network interfaces, and essential security functions.

Configuration Selection Identify the most recent complete, authorized, and internally consistent configuration baseline.

Core Service Initialization Start identity, storage, time, state, event, policy, and service-management functions.

Communication Initialization Activate required local communication networks in a non-commanding discovery condition.

Physical-System Observation Read available component and Interface states without assuming control authority.

Discovery and Identity Verification Identify currently present components and compare them with the approved configuration.

Topology and Dependency Reconstruction Re-establish known physical and logical relationships.

Configuration and State Reconciliation Compare stored, observed, and requested configurations.

Controlled Service Activation Activate services in dependency and criticality order.

Operational Authorization Permit higher-level systems to operate only after the required boot conditions are satisfied.

A software restart shall not unnecessarily interrupt independent physical safety systems.

A restart request shall identify whether it affects:

a single BIOS service;

one BIOS node;

a building zone;

the complete BIOS;

connected equipment;

higher-level systems.

Unexpected restart shall generate an event containing the apparent cause, preceding health state, incomplete transactions, and recovery result.

## 27. Secure Boot

Secure Boot shall ensure that only authorized and integrity-verified BIOS software executes within the trusted BIOS environment.

The secure boot chain shall begin from a protected root of trust that is resistant to unauthorized modification. Each subsequent boot stage shall be verified before control is transferred to it.

The verified chain may include:

immutable or protected initial boot code;

bootloader;

BIOS operating environment;

BIOS Core;

trusted drivers;

security services;

configuration schema;

critical policy packages;

recovery environment.

Every verified software object shall include:

publisher or approving authority;

version;

cryptographic integrity value;

signature;

permitted platform;

validity status;

revocation status.

Secure Boot shall reject:

unsigned critical software;

corrupted software;

revoked versions;

unauthorized downgrades;

incompatible drivers;

altered policy packages;

untrusted recovery images.

If normal boot verification fails, the system shall enter a defined recovery or restricted mode. It shall not continue ordinary operation while falsely reporting trusted status.

Manufacturer-provided drivers shall not automatically inherit BIOS Core trust. Drivers shall be verified, version-controlled, permission-restricted, and isolated according to their function.

Secure Boot shall support controlled key rotation and replacement of compromised trust authorities without destroying building identity or configuration continuity.

The BIOS shall expose its current boot-integrity status to authorized users and higher-level systems.

## 28. Power-On Self-Test

The Power-On Self-Test, or POST, verifies that the BIOS platform can safely perform its foundational functions.

POST shall evaluate, as applicable:

processor operation;

volatile memory;

persistent storage availability;

storage integrity;

hardware security module;

cryptographic functions;

real-time clock;

watchdog;

local display or service interface;

network interfaces;

backup power;

environmental sensors;

redundant BIOS communication;

recovery image availability.

POST shall distinguish among:

passed;

passed with advisory;

degraded but bootable;

recovery required;

boot prohibited.

A failed optional communication interface may permit degraded operation if an alternative authorized path exists. Failure of the root of trust, authoritative configuration storage, or required integrity checks shall prevent normal boot.

POST shall not claim to test the complete physical building. It verifies the BIOS platform and only those connected building functions for which defined startup tests exist.

Extended self-tests may be scheduled after essential BIOS availability is established. These may include:

network reachability;

Cartridge communication;

redundant-path tests;

storage consistency;

backup verification;

selected sensor validation;

safety-system status exchange.

Self-test results shall include:

test identity;

tested component;

method;

result;

measured values;

applicable threshold;

timestamp;

BIOS version;

unresolved action.

Repeated intermittent failures shall not be hidden by a later successful test.

## 29. Core Infrastructure Initialization

Core Infrastructure Initialization establishes the minimum BIOS services required before building discovery and configuration validation can begin.

Services shall initialize in dependency order.

The minimum sequence is:

trusted identity services;

secure storage access;

configuration database;

time and sequence service;

event logging;

State Engine;

Policy and Rules Engine;

authorization services;

Hardware and Cartridge Abstraction Layer;

Interface Abstraction Layer;

Service Manager;

local API gateway;

discovery services.

Each service shall complete its startup health check before dependent services are activated.

Persistent configuration shall initially be loaded into a protected validation context. It shall not become the active configuration until schema, integrity, signature, version, and dependency checks have completed.

The BIOS shall establish a startup event channel before initiating discovery so that early faults and changes are not lost.

Communication interfaces shall initially operate with minimum privileges. Discovery traffic shall not automatically authorize control commands or unrestricted network access.

If a core service cannot start, the Service Manager shall identify:

failed service;

required dependencies;

affected functions;

permitted degraded mode;

recovery action;

whether building operation may continue.

## 30. Interface Discovery

Interface Discovery identifies physical or digital Interfaces currently available to the BIOS.

Discovery may occur through:

wired network enumeration;

wireless discovery;

direct controller communication;

RFID or NFC scanning;

optical-code scanning;

robotic inspection;

imported installation records;

manual authorized registration;

inference from a registered passive component followed by physical verification.

For every discovered Interface, the BIOS shall attempt to determine:

Interface Instance ID;

Interface Type ID;

host component;

physical or logical location;

domain;

version;

Compatibility Class;

current connection state;

connected counterpart, if detectable;

available capabilities;

communication path;

verification confidence.

The BIOS shall distinguish among:

expected and discovered;

expected but not discovered;

newly discovered;

discovered in an unexpected location;

discovered but unidentified;

duplicate identity;

connected but unregistered;

registered but physically absent;

unavailable because of communication failure.

Passive structural, mechanical, or utility Interfaces may require installation records, scanning, inspection, or Digital Twin data because they cannot announce themselves electronically.

Discovery shall not modify the approved configuration automatically. Newly discovered Interfaces shall remain pending until identity, location, compatibility, and authorization are verified.

A discovery result shall record its source and confidence. The system shall not treat inferred physical connection as equivalent to inspected or sensor-verified connection.

## 31. Cartridge Discovery

Cartridge Discovery identifies Cartridge instances physically or digitally present within the building.

A Cartridge may announce itself through a trusted electronic connection or may be identified through:

machine-readable physical marking;

RFID or NFC;

robotic vision;

commissioning equipment;

installer registration;

associated Interface identity;

factory-provisioned building records.

For each Cartridge, the BIOS shall retrieve or construct a discovery record containing:

Cartridge Instance ID;

Cartridge Type ID;

manufacturer;

model and version;

physical location;

host-side Interfaces;

service-side Interfaces;

classification;

Digital Passport reference;

declared capabilities;

current lifecycle state;

communication status;

observed physical state.

Discovery shall not automatically establish that the Cartridge is:

authentic;

compatible;

installed correctly;

commissioned;

certified;

authorized to operate.

The BIOS shall compare discovered Cartridges with the approved Building Manifest.

Possible results include:

expected Cartridge correctly located;

expected Cartridge relocated;

expected Cartridge missing;

approved replacement discovered;

unknown Cartridge discovered;

duplicate Instance ID;

incompatible Cartridge;

decommissioned Cartridge reconnected;

Cartridge with expired or withdrawn certification;

Cartridge configuration different from the registered configuration.

Unknown or conflicting Cartridges shall remain isolated from protected services until resolved.

Passive Cartridges may be represented through a durable installation record linked to their physical identifier. Their absence or replacement shall require inspection or authorized confirmation.

## 32. Identity Verification

Identity Verification establishes whether a discovered BIOS node, Interface, Cartridge, service, user, robot, or external system is the entity it claims to be.

Verification methods may include:

cryptographic device credentials;

digital signatures;

secure hardware identity;

manufacturer certificates;

System05 Registry confirmation;

trusted physical marking;

supervised enrollment;

inspection of serial and manufacturing records;

multi-factor human authentication.

Identity Verification shall evaluate:

identifier validity;

issuer trust;

credential validity period;

revocation status;

identity duplication;

consistency with physical markings;

consistency with Type Registration;

consistency with installed location;

consistency with previous lifecycle records.

The BIOS shall assign an identity status:

verified;

provisionally verified;

physically identified but digitally unauthenticated;

expired;

revoked;

duplicate;

inconsistent;

unknown.

The required verification strength shall reflect the authority and criticality of the entity. A passive finish Cartridge may use durable physical identification, while a control or Safety Cartridge may require hardware-backed cryptographic authentication.

A verified identity does not imply compatibility, health, certification, or authorization. These shall be evaluated separately.

Identity failure shall not erase the discovered object. The object shall remain recorded in an untrusted or quarantined state for investigation.

Replacement of a damaged identifier shall preserve the original Instance Identity and create a traceable re-identification event.

## 33. Enrollment and Registration

Enrollment is the process through which a verified entity is admitted into the configuration scope of a specific building.

Registration records the entity within the authoritative BIOS Registry.

Enrollment shall require:

verified or approved provisional identity;

recognized Type Identity;

intended building location;

host relationship;

Interface definitions;

compatibility precheck;

applicable Engineering Profile;

authorization by the appropriate role;

available evidence and certification;

lifecycle status suitable for installation.

The enrollment record shall identify:

enrolling authority;

enrollment method;

date and time;

building configuration version;

assigned location;

host and dependency relationships;

initial permissions;

restrictions;

required commissioning actions.

Entities may receive enrollment status as:

pending;

provisionally enrolled;

enrolled but not connected;

connected but not commissioned;

active;

suspended;

rejected;

removed;

decommissioned.

Factory pre-enrollment may prepare Cartridges for a specific building, but site verification shall confirm that the intended physical Instance and location are correct.

Automatic enrollment may be permitted for low-risk predefined components within an approved procurement and installation process. Safety-critical, structural, control-authority, or security-sensitive entities shall require stronger authorization.

Removal from the active building Registry shall not delete lifecycle history. The record shall transition to removed, transferred, or decommissioned status.

## 34. Compatibility Verification

During boot and activation, Compatibility Verification confirms that every proposed relationship satisfies the approved building configuration.

The BIOS shall evaluate compatibility across applicable dimensions:

Type and version;

physical geometry;

Interface profile;

structural capacity;

mechanical engagement;

electrical characteristics;

fluid characteristics;

thermal and environmental limits;

data protocols;

control authority;

safety classification;

lifecycle requirements;

Regional Engineering Profile;

project-specific restrictions.

Verification shall compare:

provided capability;

required capability;

approved design requirement;

host limit;

current observed condition;

component certification;

active restrictions.

The result shall be:

compatible;

compatible with reduced capability;

conditionally compatible;

adapter required;

incompatible;

indeterminate.

Conditional compatibility shall identify the exact unmet condition, required corrective action, temporary restrictions, and authorization needed.

Compatibility inherited from an earlier configuration shall be re-evaluated when:

a component or Cartridge is replaced;

an Interface version changes;

configuration is modified;

firmware affects behavior;

an Engineering Profile changes;

damage or degradation reduces capacity;

a new adapter is introduced.

The BIOS shall not authorize operation where a safety-critical compatibility result is indeterminate.

## 35. Capability Negotiation

Capability Negotiation establishes the mutually supported and authorized operating configuration of connected components.

The BIOS shall collect:

capabilities provided by each side;

capabilities required by each side;

certified limits;

negotiated Interface limits;

building-design requirements;

Engineering Profile limits;

current degraded-state restrictions;

policy restrictions.

Negotiation shall determine:

enabled capabilities;

disabled optional capabilities;

operating ranges;

communication mode;

control relationships;

resource allocations;

fallback behavior;

required monitoring;

renewal or renegotiation conditions.

The negotiated operating capability shall never exceed the lowest applicable verified limit.

A higher-capacity Cartridge may operate at a lower limit if its behavior remains compatible. A lower-capacity Cartridge shall not be accepted where the building design requires greater performance.

Negotiation shall not independently alter:

structural design capacity;

fire-safety configuration;

regulatory requirements;

emergency authority;

certified safety logic;

project-approved operating limits.

Such changes require authorized configuration review.

The negotiation result shall be stored as part of the active Interface and Cartridge configuration.

Renegotiation shall occur when:

a dependency changes;

the building enters another operating mode;

a component becomes degraded;

software or firmware changes;

a resource becomes unavailable;

a new capability is activated.

## 36. Topology Construction

Topology Construction creates the BIOS representation of how building entities are physically, functionally, spatially, and digitally related.

The BIOS shall construct several coordinated topology views:

Physical Connection Topology: which Interfaces and components are physically connected;

Structural Topology: load-transfer and support relationships;

Utility Topology: electrical, water, wastewater, air, thermal, and other service paths;

Communication Topology: networks, gateways, and data routes;

Control Topology: command, supervision, and authority relationships;

Spatial Topology: site, building, level, zone, room, grid, Node, and Cartridge locations;

Dependency Topology: which entities require other entities to operate safely.

Each topology edge shall identify:

source and destination;

relationship type;

direction;

Interface IDs;

state;

capacity or operating limit;

verification method;

applicable configuration version.

Topology shall be derived from approved design information and reconciled with observed physical evidence.

The BIOS shall detect:

missing expected connections;

unexpected connections;

loops where prohibited;

disconnected required dependencies;

conflicting control authority;

incorrect utility routing;

orphaned components;

duplicated spatial assignments.

A topology conflict shall prevent activation of affected systems where the physical relationship cannot be safely determined.

## 37. Configuration Validation

Configuration Validation determines whether the reconstructed building configuration is complete, internally consistent, permitted, and suitable for the intended operating mode.

Validation shall include:

schema validity;

identity uniqueness;

version consistency;

Interface compatibility;

capability sufficiency;

complete required dependencies;

topology consistency;

spatial consistency;

Engineering Profile compliance;

authorization validity;

certification status;

required inspection status;

unresolved fault status;

safety-system availability;

configuration-signature integrity.

Validation rules shall identify whether a violation is:

informational;

warning;

operational restriction;

activation blocker;

emergency condition.

A missing optional Cartridge may generate a warning. A missing required structural, electrical-protection, fire-safety, or emergency dependency shall block the affected operating mode.

The BIOS shall validate both the complete building and relevant subgraphs. A fault in one isolated zone should not unnecessarily prevent safe operation of independent zones.

The validation report shall identify:

rule violated;

affected entities;

configuration version;

evidence evaluated;

operational consequence;

required corrective action;

responsible authority.

Configuration shall not become authoritative merely because it is syntactically valid. Physical verification and engineering approval shall be required where applicable.

## 38. Commissioning and Activation

Commissioning verifies that enrolled components, Interfaces, Cartridges, and BIOS services perform correctly in their installed configuration.

Activation authorizes them to participate in building operation.

Commissioning shall verify, as applicable:

physical presence;

location and orientation;

Interface seating and locking;

structural support;

grounding and bonding;

utility connection;

sealing and leakage;

communication;

identity;

firmware and configuration;

sensor response;

actuator operation;

control authority;

interlocks;

alarms;

safe state;

emergency behavior;

Digital Twin synchronization.

Commissioning may occur at:

component level;

Interface level;

Cartridge level;

subsystem level;

zone level;

building level.

Each commissioned entity shall receive:

commissioning status;

date;

responsible authority;

tests performed;

evidence;

accepted limitations;

next inspection or maintenance requirement.

Activation shall occur only after all required commissioning hold points are satisfied.

Activation may authorize:

monitoring only;

limited operation;

temporary operation;

degraded operation;

full operation;

emergency-only operation.

A command-capable component shall receive only the control permissions required by its commissioned role.

Commissioning failure shall return the affected entity to a safe, connected-but-inactive, isolated, or faulted state.

## 39. Boot Completion

Boot Completion is the formal declaration that the BIOS has established a valid operating condition for the selected building mode.

Boot shall be considered complete only when:

BIOS integrity is verified;

authoritative configuration is loaded;

essential Core services are healthy;

required registries are available;

required Interfaces and Cartridges are discovered or accounted for;

identities are sufficiently verified;

topology is reconstructed;

configuration validation is complete;

state conflicts affecting operation are resolved or isolated;

essential dependencies are available;

required safety-system status is known;

authorized services are activated;

startup events are stored;

recovery status is confirmed.

Boot completion may result in:

full normal operation;

partial operation;

degraded operation;

maintenance mode;

emergency mode;

safe mode;

recovery mode;

boot failure.

The BIOS shall publish a Boot Status Record containing:

boot identifier;

start and completion times;

boot type;

BIOS version;

configuration version;

operating mode;

unavailable entities;

active restrictions;

faults;

services started;

required human actions.

Higher-level systems shall not infer normal building readiness from BIOS network availability alone. They shall read the authoritative Boot Status and their own service authorization.

## 40. Safe Boot and Recovery Mode

Safe Boot is a restricted startup condition used when the BIOS cannot establish sufficient trust, configuration integrity, compatibility, or system health for normal operation.

Safe Boot may be triggered by:

secure boot failure;

corrupted configuration;

failed update;

inconsistent storage;

unknown hardware migration;

duplicate identities;

unresolved topology conflict;

failed critical service;

repeated restart;

cybersecurity incident;

incomplete configuration change;

invalid policy package;

unavailable critical dependency.

In Safe Boot, the BIOS shall start only the minimum services required for:

identity;

integrity checking;

local authorized access;

essential event logging;

configuration inspection;

backup restoration;

diagnostic communication;

emergency information;

controlled recovery.

Nonessential control, automation, AI, remote access, and third-party services shall remain disabled unless specifically required for recovery.

Recovery Mode shall provide controlled operations such as:

verify storage;

inspect configuration versions;

restore a known valid baseline;

roll back an incomplete software update;

replace revoked credentials;

re-enroll BIOS hardware;

reconstruct registries;

export diagnostic records;

disable a failed driver or service;

isolate an incompatible component;

recommission affected systems.

Recovery actions shall require authorization appropriate to their consequence.

The BIOS shall not restore an earlier digital configuration if the physical building has changed irreversibly without first reconciling the physical condition.

A recovered system shall undergo:

integrity verification;

configuration validation;

topology reconstruction;

state reconciliation;

affected-system commissioning;

authorization;

recovery-event recording.

Safe Boot shall remain visibly distinguishable from normal operation. It shall not conceal unavailable safety functions, isolated systems, or incomplete recovery.

## PART IV — Registry & Configuration Management

41. Building Manifest

The Building Manifest is the authoritative top-level declaration of the identity, intended composition, approved configuration, and governing engineering context of a System05 building.

The Manifest shall provide the entry point through which the Building BIOS determines what the building is expected to contain and how its configuration records are organized.

The Building Manifest shall include:

unique Building ID;

building name or designation;

site identity;

geographic location;

jurisdiction;

building type and occupancy classification;

project identity;

design and commissioning authorities;

current lifecycle stage;

current configuration version;

applicable System05 constitutional documents;

applicable Engineering Profiles;

applicable regulatory references;

references to all BIOS registries;

topology version;

configuration-baseline reference;

certification and commissioning status;

emergency-information reference;

authorized BIOS implementations;

digital-signature and approval records.

The Manifest shall distinguish among:

required building systems;

installed optional systems;

planned future systems;

temporarily unavailable systems;

removed systems;

legacy systems;

experimental systems.

The Manifest shall not contain every detailed component record directly. It shall identify and bind together the registries, Profiles, topology models, configuration baselines, and evidence packages forming the complete authoritative configuration.

A proposed Manifest may represent an As-Designed configuration. It shall not be promoted to As-Installed or As-Commissioned status without the required physical verification and commissioning evidence.

Every accepted Manifest shall be immutable as a historical version. Changes shall produce a new signed version linked to the preceding version.

The Building ID shall remain stable through:

ownership transfer;

BIOS hardware replacement;

software migration;

renovation;

building expansion;

temporary shutdown;

replacement of major systems.

Subdivision, physical relocation, combination with another building, or complete reconstruction may require a formal identity-governance decision.

## 42. Component Registry

The Component Registry is the authoritative inventory of physical and digitally represented components associated with the building.

A Component is any identifiable building element whose location, function, condition, relationship, lifecycle history, or engineering role requires persistent representation.

The Registry may include:

structural members;

Nodes;

panels;

fasteners or critical connection elements;

equipment;

doors and windows;

electrical devices;

plumbing components;

mechanical equipment;

sensors;

controllers;

safety devices;

passive materials or assemblies;

legacy components;

temporary construction components.

Each Component record shall include, as applicable:

Component Instance ID;

Component Type ID;

manufacturer;

model;

version;

serial or batch identifier;

material or construction type;

current owner or custodian where relevant;

spatial location;

host component;

installed Interfaces;

capabilities;

dependencies;

criticality;

certification status;

installation date;

commissioning status;

inspection and maintenance requirements;

current lifecycle state;

Digital Passport or material-record reference;

evidence references.

The Registry shall distinguish among:

expected component;

delivered component;

installed component;

commissioned component;

operational component;

removed component;

missing component;

quarantined component;

decommissioned component.

Passive components may be registered through physical marking, manufacturing records, installation evidence, inspection, or association with a registered assembly.

The Registry shall not delete a component record after removal. Its state, location, and relationship shall be updated while preserving its history.

Replacement components shall receive their own Instance IDs. The identity of a removed component shall not be transferred to a replacement.

## 43. Cartridge Registry

The Cartridge Registry is the specialized authoritative inventory of all Cartridge Types and Cartridge Instances associated with the building.

Each Cartridge Type record shall include:

Cartridge Type ID;

manufacturer;

product family;

version;

Cartridge classification;

standard form factor;

applicable Interface Types;

Capability Declaration;

environmental and operating limits;

applicable Engineering Profiles;

certification;

maintenance requirements;

software-support status;

approved replacement relationships.

Each Cartridge Instance record shall include:

Cartridge Instance ID;

associated Type ID;

actual manufacturing configuration;

production batch;

factory-test status;

Digital Passport;

current building and location;

host component;

connected Interface Instances;

negotiated capabilities;

installed firmware and software;

commissioning records;

active restrictions;

faults;

maintenance history;

connection-cycle history where applicable;

lifecycle state.

The Registry shall identify whether a Cartridge is:

registered but not assigned;

assigned to a planned location;

delivered;

stored onsite;

installed;

connected;

commissioned;

operational;

degraded;

isolated;

removed;

under refurbishment;

approved for reuse;

decommissioned.

A Cartridge discovered in the building but absent from the approved Registry shall enter an Unregistered or Quarantined state.

A registered Cartridge installed in a different location shall not be automatically re-associated. Location, compatibility, dependency, and authorization shall be verified.

The Cartridge Registry shall maintain the history of every host relationship. Reusable Cartridges shall carry their history across buildings without losing the identity of the physical Instance.

## 44. Interface Registry

The Interface Registry records every defined Interface Type and every Interface Instance represented within the building.

Each Interface Type record shall include:

Interface Type ID;

domain or multi-domain classification;

version;

Compatibility Class;

Interface Profile;

controlled geometry reference;

Capability Declaration schema;

connection protocol;

state model;

inspection requirements;

safety classification;

evidence and certification requirements.

Each Interface Instance record shall include:

Interface Instance ID;

Type ID;

host component or Cartridge;

physical or logical location;

local coordinate system;

orientation;

current connection counterpart;

current connection state;

negotiated capability;

applicable environmental condition;

lock and verification status;

inspection status;

fault status;

lifecycle history.

The Interface Registry shall represent unoccupied Interfaces as well as occupied Interfaces. Unused Interfaces may require protective covers, isolation, environmental sealing, or reserved-capacity records.

Connection shall be represented as a relationship between two or more Interface Instance IDs. The BIOS shall not store connection merely as text within a component record.

The Registry shall distinguish:

available;

reserved;

partially engaged;

connected but not commissioned;

commissioned;

operational;

degraded;

isolated;

faulted;

disconnected;

permanently closed;

decommissioned.

If both sides of a connection report inconsistent states, the Interface Registry shall preserve both observations and record a State Conflict rather than silently selecting one.

## 45. Spatial Registry

The Spatial Registry defines the authoritative spatial organization of the building and assigns registered entities to controlled locations.

The spatial hierarchy may include:

portfolio;

site;

building;

wing;

level;

zone;

room;

service space;

structural grid;

assembly;

Node;

Interface position;

Cartridge bay.

Every spatial entity shall have:

Spatial ID;

name or designation;

type;

parent location;

coordinate reference system;

geometry or boundary reference;

permitted uses;

environmental classification;

access classification;

applicable Engineering Profiles.

Component and Cartridge records shall reference Spatial IDs rather than relying solely upon informal room names.

The Spatial Registry shall support:

global site coordinates;

building coordinates;

level coordinates;

structural-grid coordinates;

local assembly coordinates;

component and Interface coordinate systems.

Transformations among coordinate systems shall be versioned and traceable.

The Registry shall distinguish among:

designed location;

manufactured reference location;

planned installation location;

surveyed installed location;

current verified location;

temporary storage location;

unknown location.

Location precision shall reflect the application. Room-level location may be sufficient for movable low-risk equipment, while structural Nodes and robotic Interfaces may require precise six-degree-of-freedom coordinates.

A relocated component shall produce a spatial-change event and trigger compatibility and dependency review where location affects performance, safety, access, environment, or regulation.

## 46. Capability Registry

The Capability Registry records what building entities can provide, require, receive, control, measure, or tolerate.

Capabilities may relate to:

structural resistance;

mechanical movement;

electrical power;

fluid supply or discharge;

thermal performance;

sensing;

communication;

control;

computation;

robotic handling;

safety and emergency functions;

environmental resistance;

human accessibility.

Each capability record shall include:

Capability ID;

capability type;

providing or requiring entity;

Interface through which it is available;

direction;

unit;

nominal value;

minimum and maximum values;

accuracy or uncertainty;

operating conditions;

capacity duration;

dependencies;

safety classification;

evidence reference;

current availability;

applicable configuration version.

The Registry shall distinguish among:

declared capability;

certified capability;

design-required capability;

negotiated capability;

measured capability;

degraded capability;

unavailable capability.

A manufacturer-declared maximum shall not automatically become the building’s authorized operating limit. The active limit shall be the lowest applicable verified restriction from the component, Interface, project design, Engineering Profile, host system, current condition, and policy.

Capabilities may be aggregated only through approved rules. Capacities of parallel components shall not be added if common dependencies, flow limits, control conflicts, or failure modes prevent simultaneous delivery.

When a component degrades, the Registry shall update its currently available capability without altering its historical certified capability.

## 47. Building Topology Graph

The Building Topology Graph is the authoritative graph representation of the building’s entities and engineering relationships.

Graph nodes may represent:

buildings and spatial zones;

structural components;

Nodes;

Cartridges;

Interfaces;

equipment;

sensors;

controllers;

services;

users or authorities;

external infrastructure.

Graph edges may represent:

physically connected to;

structurally supported by;

supplies;

drains to;

communicates with;

controls;

monitors;

located in;

hosted by;

depends upon;

protects;

isolates;

replaces;

derived from.

Every graph node and edge shall have:

unique identity;

type;

current state;

effective configuration version;

provenance;

verification status.

The topology graph shall support multiple coordinated engineering views rather than forcing all relationships into a single undifferentiated network.

The structural view shall show load-path relationships. The utility view shall show service distribution. The communication view shall show data paths. The control view shall show authority. The dependency view shall show operational reliance.

The graph shall enable queries such as:

Which components depend upon this Cartridge?

Which shutoff isolates this water branch?

Which structural members transfer load through this Node?

Which sensors inform this controller?

Which Interfaces will be affected by removing this wall panel?

Which systems lose operation if this BIOS node fails?

Which emergency devices protect this zone?

Graph modifications shall occur through Configuration Change Management rather than uncontrolled direct editing.

## 48. Interface Connection Map

The Interface Connection Map is the specialized representation of all actual, planned, available, and historical Interface connections within the building.

Each connection record shall include:

Connection ID;

participating Interface Instance IDs;

participating component or Cartridge IDs;

connection type;

physical or logical location;

connection direction where applicable;

Interface versions;

Compatibility Classes;

negotiated capabilities;

connection state;

locking and sealing status;

commissioning status;

installation date;

disconnection date where applicable;

evidence references.

The map shall identify:

direct connections;

connections through adapters;

multi-party connections;

temporary connections;

redundant connections;

inactive but physically present connections;

planned future connections;

legacy connections;

experimental connections.

Connections through an adapter shall show both Interface relationships and the adapter as a separate registered entity.

The map shall detect:

one-to-many connection where only one-to-one is permitted;

incompatible mating classes;

duplicate use of one physical Interface;

missing required counterpart;

unexpected cross-domain connection;

inconsistent connection states;

connection without commissioning;

connection lacking required evidence.

The Connection Map shall support safe-disconnection planning by identifying all transferred functions and dependent entities associated with the connection.

Historical connections shall remain traceable after disconnection or replacement.

## 49. Dependency Map

The Dependency Map identifies which building entities require other entities, resources, services, or conditions to function safely and correctly.

Dependency types may include:

structural support;

electrical supply;

grounding;

water supply;

drainage;

ventilation;

communication;

control authorization;

sensing;

time synchronization;

cooling;

environmental protection;

fire protection;

software service;

human supervision;

emergency backup.

Each dependency shall identify:

dependent entity;

required entity or capability;

dependency type;

minimum acceptable capability;

criticality;

permitted interruption duration;

fallback resource;

behavior upon loss;

restoration sequence.

Dependencies shall be classified as:

mandatory;

optional;

conditional;

redundant;

temporary;

commissioning-only;

emergency-only.

The BIOS shall use the Dependency Map before authorizing:

shutdown;

isolation;

maintenance;

removal;

replacement;

software update;

configuration change;

emergency action.

Circular dependencies shall be identified and evaluated. A startup sequence shall not require two services to wait indefinitely for each other.

Common dependencies shall be visible. Two nominally redundant systems shall not be represented as independent if they share the same power supply, communication gateway, cooling system, or control service.

Loss of a dependency shall cause affected entities to transition according to their defined degraded, isolated, or safe-state behavior.

## 50. Engineering Profile Configuration

Engineering Profile Configuration identifies the universal, regional, project-specific, environmental, operational, and experimental Profiles governing the building.

Each configured Profile shall include:

Profile ID;

title and purpose;

issuing authority;

version;

effective scope;

applicable entities or locations;

mandatory requirements;

recommended provisions;

optional provisions;

exceptions;

evidence requirements;

effective date;

superseded Profile reference.

Profiles may include:

System05 universal profiles;

Regional Engineering Profiles;

structural profiles;

electrical and utility profiles;

environmental profiles;

safety profiles;

robotic-installation profiles;

accessibility profiles;

cybersecurity profiles;

owner operational profiles;

experimental profiles.

The BIOS shall maintain a defined hierarchy of authority. Regulatory and safety requirements shall not be overridden by lower-authority convenience or owner-preference Profiles.

Where Profiles conflict, the BIOS shall:

identify the conflicting requirements;

determine whether an explicit precedence rule exists;

apply the valid higher-authority requirement;

block affected configuration where conflict remains unresolved;

record the resolution and authority.

Profile selection shall not be inferred solely from geographic location. Jurisdiction, building use, system type, project approval, and effective dates shall be verified.

Changes to Profile Configuration shall trigger impact analysis across all affected components, Interfaces, capabilities, and certifications.

## 51. Configuration Baseline

A Configuration Baseline is an approved, complete, internally consistent, and versioned snapshot of the building configuration at a defined lifecycle point.

A baseline shall include or reference:

Building Manifest;

Component Registry;

Cartridge Registry;

Interface Registry;

Spatial Registry;

Capability Registry;

Building Topology Graph;

Interface Connection Map;

Dependency Map;

Engineering Profile Configuration;

active policy and rule versions;

approved software and firmware versions;

commissioning and certification status;

active restrictions and accepted deviations.

Baseline types may include:

As-Designed;

As-Approved;

As-Manufactured;

As-Delivered;

As-Installed;

As-Commissioned;

As-Operated;

As-Maintained;

As-Modified;

Emergency;

Recovery;

As-Decommissioned.

The As-Commissioned Baseline shall represent the initial authoritative operational configuration.

A baseline shall have:

unique Baseline ID;

version;

creation date;

author;

approving authority;

integrity signature;

evidence package;

relationship to previous baseline;

effective status.

A baseline shall be atomic. Registries and topology records from different uncoordinated configuration versions shall not be combined and represented as one approved state.

Historical baselines shall remain immutable and available for audit, diagnosis, rollback assessment, renovation, and lifecycle analysis.

## 52. Configuration Change Management

Configuration Change Management controls every modification affecting the approved building configuration.

A change may involve:

adding or removing a component;

replacing a Cartridge;

changing an Interface connection;

relocating equipment;

changing capacity;

changing an Engineering Profile;

modifying dependencies;

updating firmware or software;

changing control authority;

altering safety behavior;

introducing a Legacy Adapter;

enabling a new capability.

Changes shall be classified as:

administrative;

minor operational;

maintenance;

functional;

capacity-affecting;

Interface-affecting;

structural;

safety-affecting;

security-affecting;

emergency;

experimental.

Each change request shall include:

Change ID;

purpose;

initiating authority;

affected entities;

proposed configuration;

engineering rationale;

compatibility analysis;

dependency impact;

safety and security impact;

evidence;

implementation procedure;

verification plan;

rollback or recovery plan;

required approvals;

planned schedule.

The change process shall include:

submission;

completeness review;

authority verification;

technical validation;

impact analysis;

approval or rejection;

implementation;

physical verification;

commissioning;

baseline update;

closure.

Emergency changes may use an accelerated process but shall still preserve identity, authority, event records, temporary restrictions, and post-event review.

Unapproved field modifications shall be recorded as configuration drift rather than incorporated silently into the approved baseline.

## 53. Configuration Validation

Configuration Validation evaluates whether a proposed or observed configuration satisfies all applicable structural, physical, utility, digital, safety, security, operational, and lifecycle requirements.

Validation shall occur:

before initial commissioning;

during boot;

before configuration change;

after component replacement;

after software or firmware update;

after Profile change;

after recovery;

when configuration drift is detected;

at defined inspection intervals.

Validation shall evaluate:

identity completeness;

schema correctness;

version compatibility;

location validity;

Interface compatibility;

capability sufficiency;

dependency completeness;

topology consistency;

Profile compliance;

permission validity;

certification status;

commissioning status;

lifecycle status;

safety and security restrictions;

known faults and recalls.

Validation results shall be:

valid;

valid with advisory;

valid with operational restrictions;

conditionally valid;

invalid;

indeterminate.

Every failed or conditional rule shall identify:

Rule ID;

affected entities;

required condition;

actual condition;

severity;

consequence;

permitted temporary behavior;

corrective action;

approval authority.

Automated validation shall not claim completion of engineering review when requirements depend upon professional judgment, physical testing, inspection, or regulatory approval.

Validation reports shall be preserved with the exact configuration version evaluated.

## 54. Configuration Drift Detection

Configuration Drift is any difference between the approved Configuration Baseline and the current physical, digital, operational, or observed condition.

Drift may result from:

unauthorized component replacement;

component relocation;

unrecorded Interface connection;

missing component;

firmware or software change;

parameter modification;

expired certification;

changed capability;

failed or bypassed safety function;

disabled communication;

manual override;

undocumented repair;

Digital Twin inconsistency;

damaged or unreadable identity.

Drift detection may use:

component discovery;

registry comparison;

Interface-state comparison;

software inventory;

configuration hashes;

physical inspection;

robotic scanning;

sensor evidence;

maintenance records;

network observations;

Digital Twin reconciliation.

Each drift finding shall include:

affected entity;

baseline condition;

observed condition;

detection method;

confidence;

timestamp;

severity;

affected dependencies;

required response.

Drift shall be classified as:

expected temporary drift;

authorized but not yet baselined;

administrative drift;

operational drift;

safety-relevant drift;

security-relevant drift;

unknown physical drift.

The BIOS shall not automatically update the approved baseline to match observed drift. Drift shall be investigated, reversed, temporarily accepted, or formally incorporated through Configuration Change Management.

Safety-critical drift shall trigger restriction, isolation, inspection, or emergency action according to the applicable policy.

## 55. Model Reconciliation

Model Reconciliation resolves differences among the building’s digital representations and verified physical condition.

The reconciliation process shall compare:

As-Designed model;

approved Building Manifest;

BIOS registries;

Digital Twin;

Building Definition Language model;

manufacturer records;

commissioning records;

observed physical state;

maintenance and inspection findings.

A discrepancy may involve:

identity;

component type;

version;

location;

orientation;

Interface connection;

capability;

state;

dependency;

geometry;

lifecycle status.

The reconciliation process shall:

identify the discrepancy;

preserve all source records;

classify each source by authority and evidence;

determine whether the physical state can be verified;

identify the correct authoritative condition;

evaluate engineering and operational impact;

correct erroneous models through traceable changes;

initiate configuration change where the physical building has legitimately changed;

record unresolved uncertainty.

No source shall automatically dominate every discrepancy. The approved design may govern intent, while verified inspection governs actual physical presence. Certification records may govern rated capacity, while current inspection governs degraded condition.

AI may assist in matching records, detecting geometric differences, or proposing reconciliation, but shall not silently alter authoritative models.

A reconciled model shall identify the date, evidence, responsible authority, and effective configuration version.

## 56. Configuration Versioning

Configuration Versioning preserves the complete sequence of approved building configurations.

Every configuration version shall have:

unique Version ID;

parent Version ID;

creation timestamp;

effective timestamp;

author;

approving authority;

change summary;

affected entities;

applicable Manifest version;

Profile versions;

software and firmware references;

evidence;

digital signature;

status.

Version status may include:

draft;

proposed;

under review;

approved;

active;

superseded;

rejected;

recovery candidate;

archived;

invalidated.

Configuration versioning shall support:

comparison between versions;

identification of added, removed, relocated, or modified entities;

identification of changed capabilities and dependencies;

restoration planning;

audit;

lifecycle analysis.

A configuration version shall not be activated partially unless the change was explicitly designed as a phased configuration with defined intermediate states.

Software version, Interface version, Cartridge version, Profile version, and whole-building Configuration Version shall remain distinct but linked.

Branching may be used for design alternatives, simulations, proposed renovation, or emergency planning. Only one configuration—or an explicitly defined coordinated set of zone configurations—shall hold authoritative Active status for the physical building.

Version numbers shall not be reused. Deleting or hiding an unsuccessful version shall not be permitted where it affected the physical building or approval process.

## 57. Backup and Restore

Backup and Restore shall protect the building’s identity, configuration, trust records, and essential lifecycle information against hardware failure, corruption, cyberattack, accidental deletion, disaster, or migration failure.

The backup scope shall include:

Building Manifest;

all registries;

topology and dependency records;

Configuration Baselines;

configuration versions;

Engineering Profiles;

policies and rules;

authorization configuration;

Digital Passport references;

commissioning and certification records;

critical event and audit logs;

recovery credentials;

BIOS software and schema references.

The backup architecture shall provide:

local recovery copy;

physically or logically separated copy;

integrity verification;

encryption where required;

version history;

retention policy;

restore testing;

authorized export;

vendor-independent format for essential data.

Backup frequency shall reflect data criticality and change rate. Configuration changes shall trigger a backup or protected transaction checkpoint before the new baseline becomes active.

A backup shall not be considered valid solely because a file was created. It shall be checked for:

completeness;

integrity;

readability;

schema compatibility;

credential availability;

restore feasibility.

Restore shall follow:

verify recovery authority;

verify BIOS platform integrity;

select an appropriate backup;

verify backup identity and signature;

evaluate physical-building changes since the backup;

restore into an isolated validation environment;

validate registries and topology;

reconcile with the observed building;

activate the restored configuration;

recommission affected systems;

record the recovery event.

The BIOS shall not restore an old configuration blindly when Cartridges, Interfaces, physical connections, or safety systems have changed since the backup.

Recovery objectives shall define:

maximum acceptable data loss;

maximum acceptable BIOS unavailability;

essential services to restore first;

permitted degraded operating condition;

responsibility for restoration.

Backup and restore procedures shall be tested periodically. A recovery plan that has never been verified shall not be treated as proven recovery capability.

## PART V — States, Events & Core BIOS Services

58. Building State Model

The Building State Model provides the authoritative representation of the building’s current verified condition.

The building shall not be represented by a single undifferentiated state. Its condition shall be described through a coordinated state vector containing, at minimum:

lifecycle state;

configuration state;

BIOS integrity state;

operational state;

safety state;

security state;

resource state;

communication state;

maintenance state;

emergency state.

Each state value shall include:

subject identity;

state category;

current value;

source;

timestamp;

verification level;

confidence where applicable;

effective configuration version;

active restrictions;

related events.

Building-wide state shall be derived from component, Interface, Cartridge, zone, service, and dependency states through explicit aggregation rules.

The BIOS shall distinguish among:

Declared State: reported by the entity or manufacturer;

Commanded State: state requested by a controller or user;

Observed State: condition detected through communication, sensing, or inspection;

Verified State: condition confirmed by an approved method;

Inferred State: condition calculated or estimated from indirect information;

Desired State: state requested by an approved operating policy.

These states shall not be silently treated as equivalent.

Building state examples include:

unconfigured;

under construction;

commissioning;

operational;

partially operational;

degraded;

maintenance;

isolated;

emergency;

recovery;

decommissioned.

A building may be Operational while one independent noncritical zone is Degraded. Aggregate-state rules shall therefore preserve zone and system detail rather than reducing the entire building to the worst isolated condition without justification.

## 59. Component and Cartridge States

Every registered Component and Cartridge shall follow a defined lifecycle and operational state model.

The general lifecycle states are:

proposed;

registered;

manufactured;

delivered;

stored;

assigned;

installed;

commissioned;

in service;

removed;

under inspection;

under repair;

refurbished;

approved for reuse;

decommissioned;

recycled or disposed.

The general operational states are:

unknown;

unavailable;

inactive;

standby;

starting;

active;

degraded;

faulted;

isolated;

maintenance;

emergency operation;

shutting down.

Physical connection state, lifecycle state, and operational state shall remain separate. A Cartridge may be Installed, Connected, and Inactive; or Removed, Under Refurbishment, and unavailable to the building.

Each entity shall declare:

supported states;

initial state;

entry conditions;

exit conditions;

permitted commands;

prohibited commands;

required dependencies;

safe state;

fault state;

recovery states.

Passive components may not communicate their state electronically. Their state may be established through inspection, installation records, physical indicators, monitored dependencies, or authorized human confirmation.

A component reporting Active while its required Interface is Disconnected shall create a State Conflict.

Safety-critical components shall not return from Faulted to Active without the required clearance, testing, and authorization.

## 60. Interface States

Each Interface shall progress through explicit states representing its physical, functional, and authorization condition.

The general Interface states are:

Unidentified Interface identity is unknown.

Identified Type and Instance identities are available.

Verified Identity and authoritative records have been validated.

Available Interface is unoccupied and eligible for a connection process.

Reserved Interface has been assigned to a planned connection.

Approaching A component is moving through the controlled approach process.

Aligned Positional and orientation conditions are within the permitted alignment range.

Partially Engaged Physical engagement has started but seating is incomplete.

Seated The final controlled datum position has been reached.

Locked Required primary and secondary retention mechanisms are verified.

Connected Physical connection requirements are satisfied.

Commissioning Functional tests and capability negotiation are in progress.

Operational Approved functions are active.

Degraded Limited operation remains authorized.

Faulted An abnormal condition prevents normal operation.

Isolated Energy, load, flow, data, or command transfer has been controlled.

Maintenance Authorized service work is in progress.

Release-Ready Safe-disconnection preconditions are satisfied.

Disconnected Participating Interface sides are physically or logically separated.

Decommissioned The Interface is no longer authorized for future service.

Each side of an Interface connection shall maintain its own observed state. The connection relationship shall maintain a separate aggregate state.

An Interface shall not be considered Operational merely because data communication is available. All required physical, utility, safety, commissioning, and authorization conditions shall be satisfied.

## 61. Building Operating Modes

A Building Operating Mode is an approved coordinated configuration of services, permissions, resources, and state rules appropriate to a defined situation.

The BIOS shall support, as applicable:

Construction Mode;

Installation Mode;

Commissioning Mode;

Normal Occupied Mode;

Normal Unoccupied Mode;

Reduced-Energy Mode;

Maintenance Mode;

Inspection Mode;

Partial Shutdown Mode;

Utility-Outage Mode;

Severe-Weather Mode;

Fire Emergency Mode;

Other Emergency Mode;

Evacuation Mode;

Shelter Mode;

Recovery Mode;

Decommissioning Mode.

Each Operating Mode shall define:

activation authority;

entry conditions;

required systems;

optional systems;

disabled systems;

control priorities;

resource allocations;

permitted user actions;

alarm behavior;

data-retention requirements;

exit conditions;

fallback mode.

Modes shall be coordinated with physical safety systems. The BIOS shall not create an operating mode that disables required fire, structural, electrical, or emergency protection.

The current mode shall be visible to authorized occupants, operators, maintainers, and emergency responders where relevant.

Mode changes affecting safety, access, utilities, or automation shall generate events and may require confirmation of the resulting physical state.

Automatic mode selection may be permitted for predefined low-risk conditions. Safety-critical mode changes shall follow the applicable authority and verification requirements.

## 62. State Transition Rules

State Transition Rules define how an entity may move from one state to another.

Every transition rule shall include:

source state;

permitted destination state;

initiating authority;

preconditions;

required dependencies;

required evidence;

actions performed;

confirmation method;

timeout;

failure state;

rollback or recovery behavior;

generated events.

A transition shall be rejected when:

the source state is inconsistent;

the requesting entity lacks authority;

a required dependency is unavailable;

an active interlock prohibits the action;

configuration validation has failed;

identity or trust is unresolved;

required physical verification is absent;

a higher-priority emergency rule applies.

Transitions affecting physical systems shall distinguish:

request accepted;

command issued;

action in progress;

physical result observed;

result verified;

transition completed.

Timeout shall not automatically imply that the desired physical state was not reached. It shall create an indeterminate or fault state requiring further verification.

Emergency transitions may bypass selected normal sequencing steps only where the emergency policy explicitly permits them. Bypassed steps and resulting limitations shall be recorded.

State rules shall prevent unsafe shortcuts, such as:

Disconnected directly to Operational;

Loaded directly to Release-Ready;

Unverified directly to Authorized;

Faulted directly to Normal without clearance;

Decommissioned directly to Active without requalification.

## 63. Event Architecture

The Event Architecture provides the mechanism through which significant building occurrences are created, validated, transmitted, processed, stored, and consumed.

Every event shall follow a standardized envelope containing:

Event ID;

event type and version;

source identity;

subject identity;

building and location;

timestamp;

sequence number where applicable;

current configuration version;

preceding and resulting state;

severity;

measured or declared values;

data quality;

evidence reference;

required acknowledgment;

retention classification;

digital integrity information.

The architecture shall support:

real-time event delivery;

delayed delivery;

offline event storage;

ordered local sequences;

event replay;

filtered subscriptions;

event acknowledgment;

event correlation;

historical queries.

Event producers shall not determine final operational consequence unless they possess the required authority. A sensor may produce a high-temperature event, while the Policy Engine determines whether that event requires warning, shutdown, or emergency isolation.

The architecture shall prevent:

silent event loss;

duplicate processing of non-idempotent actions;

uncontrolled event storms;

low-priority events blocking critical events;

unauthorized event injection;

alteration of accepted historical events.

Events affecting configuration, safety, security, commissioning, maintenance, or control authority shall be preserved with higher integrity and retention requirements than routine telemetry.

## 64. Event Classification

Events shall be classified by function, severity, origin, confidence, and required response.

Functional event classes shall include:

identity events;

discovery events;

registration events;

configuration events;

connection events;

state-transition events;

operational events;

resource events;

diagnostic events;

fault events;

alarm events;

safety events;

security events;

maintenance events;

inspection events;

update events;

override events;

recovery events;

lifecycle events.

Severity levels shall include:

Informational: records a normal occurrence requiring no action;

Advisory: identifies a condition worth review;

Warning: indicates developing degradation or reduced margin;

Action Required: requires planned intervention;

Critical: requires immediate protective or operational action;

Emergency: indicates imminent or active danger requiring emergency response.

Event confidence shall indicate whether the event is:

directly measured;

physically verified;

device-reported;

manually reported;

inferred;

predicted;

unverified.

Origin shall identify whether the event was created by:

BIOS Core;

registered component;

Cartridge;

sensor;

controller;

human user;

robot;

AI service;

external authority;

imported record.

Severity shall not be determined solely by the producing device. BIOS policy may raise or lower operational response based upon context, dependencies, redundancy, occupancy, and Engineering Profiles while preserving the original reported severity.

## 65. Health Monitoring

Health Monitoring determines whether BIOS hardware, services, components, Cartridges, Interfaces, communication networks, storage, and dependencies remain capable of performing their required functions.

Health status shall be represented as:

healthy;

healthy with advisory;

degraded;

maintenance required;

critical;

unavailable;

unknown.

Health Monitoring may evaluate:

service availability;

communication quality;

storage integrity;

processor and memory condition;

power quality;

backup readiness;

sensor validity;

actuator response;

Interface state;

temperature;

vibration;

leakage;

corrosion;

cycle count;

calibration status;

inspection status;

software support;

cybersecurity status.

A Health Record shall include:

subject identity;

health state;

contributing indicators;

thresholds;

data source;

confidence;

trend;

time of assessment;

required action.

Health shall not be inferred solely from communication availability. A connected device may be physically failed, and a passive component may remain healthy without digital communication.

The BIOS shall distinguish among:

current failure;

degradation trend;

overdue inspection;

expired evidence;

loss of observability;

actual loss of function.

Loss of monitoring shall create an Unknown or Unverified health state rather than a false Healthy state.

## 66. Diagnostics

Diagnostics identify the cause, location, extent, and likely consequence of abnormal system behavior.

Diagnostic processes may include:

self-tests;

communication tests;

state comparison;

dependency tracing;

event correlation;

sensor cross-checking;

configuration comparison;

command-response testing;

controlled functional testing;

inspection data analysis;

trend analysis;

AI-assisted anomaly analysis.

A Diagnostic Record shall identify:

diagnostic request;

initiating condition;

affected entities;

tests performed;

observations;

hypotheses;

confidence;

confirmed findings;

excluded causes;

recommended action;

safety restrictions;

responsible authority.

Diagnostics shall distinguish between:

symptom;

suspected cause;

confirmed cause;

contributing condition;

secondary consequence.

Automated diagnostics shall not perform hazardous tests without verifying isolation, occupancy, dependencies, and authority.

AI-generated diagnoses shall remain identified as recommendations or inferences until supported by the required evidence.

The BIOS shall support dependency-aware diagnosis. If several components fail simultaneously because of one unavailable resource, the system should identify the shared dependency rather than report each component as an independent failure.

Diagnostic access shall be role-controlled. Manufacturer tools shall receive access only to authorized products and required contextual information.

## 67. Fault Management

Fault Management controls detection, classification, containment, response, clearance, and documentation of abnormal conditions.

A Fault Record shall contain:

Fault ID;

affected entity;

fault category;

detection source;

first occurrence;

most recent occurrence;

severity;

persistence;

affected capabilities;

dependencies affected;

immediate response;

permitted operating state;

required inspection or repair;

clearance authority;

evidence.

Fault categories shall include:

identity fault;

configuration fault;

Interface fault;

component fault;

resource fault;

communication fault;

control fault;

sensor fault;

software fault;

security fault;

safety fault;

environmental fault;

lifecycle fault.

Fault response may include:

record only;

warning;

capability reduction;

service restart;

transition to standby;

selective isolation;

controlled shutdown;

activation of redundancy;

emergency action;

request for human intervention.

Fault containment shall limit propagation to unaffected zones and services where possible.

Repeated faults shall not be cleared automatically in a manner that hides recurrence. Fault counters, duration, history, and environmental context shall be retained.

Safety-critical faults shall remain latched until an approved clearance process confirms that the cause has been removed and required functionality restored.

A fault shall be closed only when:

corrective action is complete;

verification has succeeded;

affected systems are recommissioned where required;

resulting state is recorded;

responsible authority approves closure.

## 68. Alarm and Notification Services

Alarm and Notification Services communicate conditions requiring awareness, acknowledgment, action, or emergency response.

An alarm indicates a condition with defined operational or safety significance. A notification communicates information that may not require immediate action.

Every alarm shall define:

alarm identity;

initiating condition;

severity;

affected zone or system;

required recipients;

communication channels;

acknowledgment requirement;

response procedure;

escalation timing;

clearance condition;

retention requirement.

Notification channels may include:

local visual indicator;

local audible signal;

building display;

mobile or desktop application;

maintenance platform;

remote monitoring service;

emergency responder interface;

machine-to-machine API.

Safety alarms shall not depend exclusively upon internet access, personal mobile devices, or a single remote service.

Alarm acknowledgment shall mean only that an authorized recipient has received the alarm. It shall not mean that the hazardous condition has been corrected.

The BIOS shall distinguish:

active alarm;

acknowledged alarm;

suppressed alarm;

silenced audible output;

cleared condition;

closed alarm record.

Suppression or temporary disabling shall require authority, reason, duration, affected-zone identification, compensating measures, and visible indication.

Alarm flooding shall be controlled through correlation and prioritization without hiding independent critical conditions.

## 69. Resource Availability Services

Resource Availability Services represent the presence, quality, capacity, and operational status of resources required by building systems.

Resources may include:

electrical power;

backup power;

potable water;

drainage capacity;

ventilation air;

heating and cooling capacity;

communication bandwidth;

computing capacity;

data storage;

time synchronization;

structural support capacity;

emergency resources;

human or robotic service access.

Each Resource Record shall identify:

resource type;

provider;

consumers;

available capacity;

committed capacity;

reserve capacity;

quality parameters;

current state;

expected duration;

redundancy;

limitations;

affected location.

The BIOS shall distinguish between:

nominal installed capacity;

certified capacity;

currently available capacity;

allocated capacity;

remaining capacity;

degraded capacity;

unavailable capacity.

Resource allocation shall respect priority. Safety and emergency functions shall receive priority over comfort, optimization, or optional services where applicable.

Resource Availability Services shall not replace physical protective devices or utility controllers. They provide coordinated information and permissions to authorized systems.

Loss or degradation of a resource shall trigger dependency analysis and state transitions for affected consumers.

## 70. Control Authority Management

Control Authority Management defines which person, service, component, Cartridge, robot, AI agent, or external system may issue commands affecting building operation.

Every control authority assignment shall specify:

controlling identity;

controlled entity or function;

permitted commands;

operating mode;

location or zone;

validity period;

priority;

required supervision;

revocation conditions;

audit requirements.

Authority levels may include:

observe only;

recommend;

request;

operate within limits;

configure;

maintain;

override;

emergency command;

administrative authority.

AI services shall not receive implicit control authority. Their permissions shall define whether they may observe, recommend, request, or directly control specific functions.

Manufacturer services shall not control installed products without building-level authorization.

Authority shall be context-sensitive. A maintenance technician may control equipment only while Maintenance Mode is active and the relevant work authorization is valid.

Emergency authority may temporarily supersede normal operational authority, but its scope, duration, and termination shall remain controlled.

Authority delegation shall be explicit, limited, revocable, and recorded. Possession of network access or credentials shall not automatically grant unrestricted physical control.

## 71. Command Arbitration

Command Arbitration resolves competing commands directed toward the same component, resource, or building function.

Every command shall include:

Command ID;

issuing identity;

target;

requested action;

priority;

authority;

operating mode;

issue time;

validity period;

preconditions;

expected result;

acknowledgment requirement.

Arbitration shall consider:

physical safety constraints;

certified local protection;

emergency commands;

regulatory requirements;

active interlocks;

authorized manual overrides;

operational control;

automated optimization;

occupant preferences;

advisory recommendations.

Higher priority shall not by itself permit a command that violates safety, configuration, capability, or Interface limits.

Conflicting commands shall produce an explicit arbitration decision identifying:

accepted command;

rejected or deferred commands;

applicable rule;

resulting state;

required notification.

Commands with expired validity shall not be executed.

The BIOS shall distinguish between command acceptance and successful execution. Physical confirmation shall be required where appropriate.

Rapidly alternating commands shall be controlled through timing rules, minimum dwell periods, hysteresis, rate limits, or local controller logic to prevent instability and equipment damage.

## 72. Interlocks and Permissions

Interlocks prevent actions until required physical, digital, procedural, or safety conditions are satisfied.

Interlock types include:

physical interlock;

mechanical interlock;

electrical interlock;

software interlock;

configuration interlock;

state interlock;

dependency interlock;

authorization interlock;

procedural hold point.

Examples include:

preventing release of a loaded structural Interface;

preventing energization before grounding and locking are verified;

preventing fluid connection release before depressurization;

preventing software update during emergency operation;

preventing robotic movement while a human occupies the exclusion zone;

preventing activation of an uncommissioned Cartridge.

Each interlock shall define:

Interlock ID;

protected hazard or condition;

blocked action;

required release conditions;

input sources;

verification method;

override authority;

fail-safe behavior;

test procedure.

A software interlock shall not replace an independent physical interlock where physical independence is required by risk or regulation.

Permission checks shall evaluate identity, role, scope, state, location, time, operating mode, and active restrictions.

Interlock override shall require explicit authorization, justification, duration, compensating measures, visible indication, and audit recording.

Loss of the input used by a safety-relevant interlock shall place the interlock into its defined conservative state.

## 73. Audit and Engineering Logs

Audit and Engineering Logs provide a durable record of actions, decisions, changes, observations, and evidence affecting the building.

Audit Logs shall record:

authentication attempts;

authorization decisions;

configuration access;

commands;

overrides;

policy changes;

software updates;

credential changes;

remote access;

security incidents;

administrative actions.

Engineering Logs shall record:

commissioning;

configuration changes;

compatibility decisions;

inspection;

maintenance;

faults;

repairs;

test results;

capacity restrictions;

Interface connection and disconnection;

Profile changes;

engineering approvals.

Each log entry shall include:

unique record identity;

timestamp;

actor;

action;

affected entity;

previous and resulting condition;

reason;

authorization;

configuration version;

evidence reference;

outcome.

Logs shall be append-only after acceptance. Corrections shall reference the original entry and preserve both records.

Retention requirements shall reflect safety, regulatory, lifecycle, warranty, security, and engineering needs.

Access shall be role-controlled. Privacy-sensitive information shall be separated or minimized while preserving necessary engineering accountability.

The BIOS shall support export in a documented format so that lifecycle history is not trapped within one vendor platform.

Clock uncertainty, offline entry, delayed synchronization, and imported historical records shall be identified explicitly.

## 74. Controlled Shutdown and Restart

Controlled Shutdown places BIOS services and affected building systems into defined states before power removal, maintenance, restart, migration, or emergency isolation.

A shutdown request shall identify:

scope;

initiating authority;

reason;

affected entities;

dependencies;

desired shutdown state;

planned restart condition;

expected duration.

The shutdown sequence shall:

validate authority;

identify dependent systems;

determine whether shutdown is permitted;

notify affected services and users;

stop accepting nonessential configuration changes;

complete or abort active transactions safely;

preserve state and event records;

transfer or stop control functions;

isolate affected physical resources where required;

stop services in dependency order;

write a validated shutdown checkpoint;

confirm shutdown completion.

The BIOS shall distinguish:

service restart;

component restart;

zone restart;

complete BIOS restart;

planned power shutdown;

emergency shutdown.

Essential independent safety systems shall remain operational where required during BIOS shutdown.

If normal shutdown cannot complete, the BIOS shall preserve the most recent valid configuration and record incomplete operations for recovery.

Restart shall not blindly restore every preceding command. Commands, overrides, temporary permissions, and operating modes shall be evaluated for current validity.

After restart, the BIOS shall:

verify integrity;

recover incomplete transactions;

rediscover affected entities;

reconcile physical and stored states;

validate configuration;

restore services in dependency order;

recommission affected functions where required;

record the restart outcome.

## PART VI — Safety, Security & Resilience

75. BIOS Safety Philosophy

The Building BIOS shall be designed as a cyber-physical coordination system whose failure, compromise, or incorrect configuration may affect physical building operation.

Safety shall not depend upon the assumption that software, networks, sensors, cloud services, AI systems, or human operators will always function correctly.

The BIOS Safety Philosophy shall follow these principles:

physical protection shall remain independent where required;

uncertainty shall produce restriction rather than unsafe activation;

critical faults shall be detectable and traceable;

failure of one service shall not unnecessarily disable independent safe systems;

commanded state shall remain distinguishable from verified physical state;

safety functions shall receive priority over convenience and optimization;

safety-critical changes shall require stronger authority and evidence;

emergency functions shall remain locally available;

recovery shall restore a verified configuration rather than merely restart software.

The BIOS shall coordinate safety information, permissions, dependencies, operating modes, and state transitions. It shall not replace certified physical or dedicated safety systems unless the BIOS implementation has been specifically engineered, tested, and certified for that function.

Hazards considered shall include:

unintended structural release;

unintended energization;

electrical isolation failure;

uncontrolled fluid release;

loss of ventilation or environmental control;

fire and smoke-system interference;

unauthorized access;

robotic movement;

false sensor information;

configuration corruption;

conflicting commands;

software or communication failure;

malicious cyber-physical action.

Safety-related decisions shall record their initiating condition, applicable rule, authority, resulting command, verified physical result, and unresolved limitations.

## 76. Root of Trust

The Root of Trust is the protected foundation from which BIOS identity, software integrity, configuration authenticity, and credential validity are established.

The Root of Trust shall provide, as applicable:

unique BIOS hardware identity;

protected cryptographic operations;

secure storage of root credentials;

verification of BIOS startup software;

verification of signed configuration;

verification of trusted updates;

protection against unauthorized rollback;

recording of platform-integrity measurements;

recovery authorization.

The Root of Trust may be implemented through dedicated security hardware, protected processor capabilities, physically secured modules, or an approved combination.

The Root of Trust shall be separable from a specific software vendor account. Loss of a vendor service shall not make the building permanently inaccessible to its authorized owner or successor operator.

The trust hierarchy shall identify:

System05 governance authorities;

certification authorities;

building ownership authority;

project commissioning authority;

manufacturer authorities;

BIOS platform authority;

recovery authority.

No single manufacturer credential shall automatically authorize control over the complete building.

Root credentials shall have defined:

issuer;

purpose;

validity;

storage method;

permitted use;

rotation procedure;

revocation procedure;

recovery method.

Compromise or suspected compromise of the Root of Trust shall trigger restricted operation and a controlled recovery process. Re-establishing trust shall preserve the building’s identity and historical records while replacing compromised credentials.

## 77. Device and Cartridge Authentication

Device and Cartridge Authentication verifies that a connected entity possesses the identity and credentials associated with its registered record.

Authentication shall occur before a device or Cartridge receives protected network access, configuration authority, control permissions, or participation in a safety-relevant service.

Authentication may use:

hardware-backed device credentials;

manufacturer-issued certificates;

System05 registration credentials;

challenge-response protocols;

signed firmware identity;

secure physical provisioning;

supervised enrollment;

durable physical identity for passive components.

The authentication process shall verify:

Device or Cartridge Instance ID;

credential issuer;

credential validity;

revocation status;

Type and version consistency;

firmware or software integrity where required;

consistency with physical identification;

consistency with the assigned building location;

absence of duplicate active identity.

Authentication status shall be:

authenticated;

provisionally authenticated;

physically identified only;

expired;

revoked;

duplicated;

inconsistent;

unauthenticated.

Authentication does not establish compatibility, certification, health, or operational authorization. Those evaluations shall remain separate.

A passive Cartridge without electronic credentials may be authenticated through physical identification, installation evidence, supervised verification, and Registry comparison. Its authentication strength shall be appropriate to its criticality.

Failed authentication shall place the entity into a quarantined or restricted state. The BIOS may permit limited diagnostic communication without granting ordinary operational access.

Repeated authentication failure or identity duplication shall generate a security event and may trigger Interface isolation.

## 78. User and Service Authentication

Every human user, software service, robot, AI agent, remote platform, and maintenance tool requesting protected BIOS access shall be authenticated.

Human authentication may include:

password or passphrase;

physical credential;

cryptographic device credential;

biometric factor where appropriate;

local approval;

multi-factor authentication;

emergency responder credential.

Service authentication shall use unique machine identities rather than shared general-purpose accounts.

Every authenticated principal shall have:

unique identity;

identity type;

issuing authority;

assigned organization;

permitted authentication methods;

credential status;

validity period;

current session status;

audit history.

Authentication requirements shall reflect consequence. Reading public product information may require little or no authentication, while changing structural configuration, disabling alarms, updating BIOS software, or issuing emergency commands shall require stronger verification.

Remote authentication shall not automatically provide the same authority as authenticated local physical presence.

Shared maintenance accounts shall be avoided because they prevent individual accountability. Where temporary service access is necessary, credentials shall be time-limited and scoped to the relevant equipment.

Authentication sessions shall expire according to risk. Critical actions may require reauthentication even during an active session.

Failed, unusual, or repeated authentication attempts shall be recorded and evaluated for possible attack or credential misuse.

## 79. Authorization and Role Management

Authorization determines which actions an authenticated identity is permitted to perform.

The BIOS shall enforce least privilege, separation of duties, limited delegation, and explicit scope.

Authorization may combine:

role-based permissions;

capability-based permissions;

location-based permissions;

state-based permissions;

time-limited permissions;

task-specific permissions;

emergency permissions.

Roles may include:

occupant;

owner;

building administrator;

installer;

commissioning authority;

inspector;

maintenance technician;

licensed engineer;

manufacturer service;

security administrator;

robot operator;

AI service;

emergency responder;

certification authority.

Each authorization assignment shall define:

authorized identity;

role or capability;

permitted actions;

affected entities;

location;

operating mode;

validity period;

supervision requirement;

prohibited actions;

revocation conditions.

No role shall receive unrestricted authority merely for administrative convenience.

High-consequence actions may require separation of duties. For example, one party may prepare a configuration change while another approves its activation.

AI agents shall receive narrowly defined access. Read access to verified configuration shall not imply permission to issue physical commands or change policy.

Manufacturer service personnel shall receive access only to authorized products and related information necessary for the approved task.

Emergency authorization shall be available where required but shall remain visible, limited, auditable, and subject to post-event review.

## 80. Secure Communication

Secure Communication shall protect the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, freshness, and availability of BIOS communications according to their risk.

Protected communication shall address:

device-to-BIOS traffic;

BIOS-node coordination;

service-to-service traffic;

local user access;

remote administration;

Digital Twin integration;

AI and cloud integration;

robotic communication;

manufacturer support;

emergency interfaces.

Communication controls shall provide, as applicable:

mutual authentication;

encryption;

message-integrity verification;

replay protection;

sequence control;

session management;

endpoint authorization;

secure error handling;

communication logging.

Safety-relevant commands shall include sufficient context to prevent misapplication, including:

issuing identity;

target identity;

command type;

validity period;

configuration version;

applicable state;

transaction or sequence identifier.

A delayed or replayed valid command shall not be accepted outside its authorized context.

Loss of secure communication shall result in defined behavior. Components may continue local preauthorized operation, enter degraded mode, preserve a safe state, or isolate themselves according to their function.

Encryption shall not prevent authorized emergency access to essential local information.

Legacy protocols lacking adequate security shall operate through controlled gateways, segmentation, monitoring, and restricted authority.

## 81. Network and Functional Segmentation

The BIOS architecture shall separate networks and functions so that compromise or failure in one area does not provide unrestricted access to the complete building.

Segmentation may separate:

BIOS Core services;

safety systems;

structural monitoring;

utility controls;

building automation;

occupant networks;

guest networks;

cameras and privacy-sensitive sensors;

robotic systems;

manufacturer maintenance access;

cloud and external services;

experimental systems;

legacy equipment.

Segmentation may be physical, logical, cryptographic, functional, or a coordinated combination.

Each segment shall define:

permitted entities;

permitted communication paths;

permitted protocols;

command authority;

data sensitivity;

gateway requirements;

monitoring;

failure behavior.

Communication between segments shall pass through controlled gateways that validate identity, authorization, message type, rate, and direction.

An occupant entertainment device shall not obtain direct access to structural, safety, utility, or BIOS Core services merely because it shares building infrastructure.

Experimental and legacy devices shall be isolated from trusted BIOS functions unless their behavior and access have been specifically controlled.

Safety-relevant local functions should remain operational during compromise or failure of noncritical network segments.

Network diagrams and functional authority maps shall remain synchronized with the active Configuration Baseline.

## 82. Signed Configuration

Every authoritative Configuration Baseline and safety-relevant configuration package shall be digitally signed or protected through an equivalent integrity and authorization mechanism.

A signed configuration shall identify:

Building ID;

Configuration Version ID;

configuration content or integrity value;

approving authority;

signing identity;

approval time;

effective time;

applicable BIOS versions;

applicable Engineering Profiles;

permitted hardware or deployment scope;

expiration or review condition;

relationship to the preceding configuration.

The BIOS shall verify before activation:

signature validity;

signer authority;

configuration integrity;

version sequence;

schema compatibility;

revocation status;

applicable building identity;

required co-approvals.

Any unauthorized modification shall invalidate the affected signature.

The BIOS shall distinguish among:

unsigned draft;

signed proposal;

approved inactive configuration;

active signed baseline;

superseded signed baseline;

revoked configuration;

emergency temporary configuration.

Emergency configuration may use an accelerated approval process but shall remain signed, time-limited, scoped, and subject to later review.

Configuration signatures shall not be transferred between buildings unless the package was explicitly designed as a reusable Type-level configuration and project-specific validation remains complete.

Loss of a signing key shall not require deletion of previously valid historical configurations. Trust records shall preserve when the signature was valid and whether later revocation affects historical or future use.

## 83. Secure Firmware and Software Updates

Firmware and software updates shall preserve system integrity, compatibility, recoverability, and building safety.

Every update package shall include:

target component or service;

current and proposed versions;

publisher identity;

digital signature;

integrity value;

compatibility requirements;

affected capabilities;

configuration changes;

safety and security impact;

installation procedure;

rollback or recovery method;

required recommissioning;

release information.

Before update, the BIOS shall verify:

package authenticity;

publisher authority;

target identity;

hardware compatibility;

Interface and protocol compatibility;

available storage and power;

system operating mode;

active emergency or maintenance conditions;

dependency impact;

recovery readiness.

Safety-critical updates shall not proceed during incompatible operating conditions.

The update process shall follow:

acquire package;

verify integrity and signature;

evaluate compatibility and impact;

obtain required approval;

create configuration checkpoint;

isolate affected service where necessary;

install into a protected inactive environment where possible;

verify installed image;

activate;

perform health checks;

recommission affected functions;

update configuration and evidence records.

Interrupted or failed updates shall not leave the component in an ambiguous partially active state.

Unauthorized downgrade shall be prevented where it would reintroduce known safety or security vulnerabilities. Approved rollback shall remain possible when required for recovery.

Software support status and end-of-support dates shall be included in the Cartridge Digital Passport.

## 84. Key and Credential Management

Key and Credential Management controls the creation, provisioning, storage, use, rotation, revocation, recovery, and destruction of cryptographic credentials.

Credential categories may include:

BIOS platform identity;

Building ID credentials;

device and Cartridge credentials;

user credentials;

service credentials;

configuration-signing keys;

software-update signing keys;

communication credentials;

emergency-access credentials;

backup-encryption keys;

recovery credentials.

Every credential shall have:

unique identifier;

owner or controlling authority;

purpose;

permitted operations;

scope;

creation date;

expiration or review date;

storage requirement;

rotation requirement;

revocation status;

recovery policy.

Private keys shall be protected from unauthorized export where appropriate. Shared keys shall be limited because compromise of one entity may affect every entity using the same secret.

Credential rotation shall avoid uncontrolled interruption of building operation. Transitional trust may permit old and new credentials for a defined period.

Revoked credentials shall be distributed to affected local BIOS systems without requiring permanent cloud connectivity.

Ownership transfer shall include controlled transfer or replacement of building-administration credentials without changing the persistent Building ID.

Emergency recovery shall not rely on a single individual, device, or vendor. High-consequence root recovery may require multiple authorized parties or physically protected recovery materials.

Credential destruction shall occur when a device is decommissioned, transferred, compromised, or permanently removed from the trust domain.

## 85. Privacy and Data Protection

The Building BIOS shall collect, process, retain, and disclose only the data necessary for its authorized engineering, operational, safety, security, and lifecycle functions.

Data shall be classified as:

public technical data;

building operational data;

confidential engineering data;

security-sensitive data;

commercially restricted data;

personal data;

highly sensitive occupant data;

emergency-access data.

The BIOS shall distinguish building engineering identity from occupant identity wherever practical.

Privacy-sensitive sources may include:

occupancy sensors;

access records;

cameras;

microphones;

health-related devices;

behavioral data;

room-use patterns;

location tracking;

energy-use patterns linked to individuals.

Privacy controls shall provide:

data minimization;

purpose limitation;

role-based access;

local processing where practical;

defined retention;

deletion or anonymization where permitted;

consent and visibility where required;

export and ownership-transfer procedures;

security of stored and transmitted data.

The BIOS shall not require continuous audio or video collection merely to provide ordinary configuration management.

AI services shall not receive unrestricted historical or occupant-sensitive data simply because they are connected to the building.

Emergency access may expose defined safety information without ordinary authorization where delay would create greater risk. Such access shall remain limited and auditable.

Deletion of personal data shall not destroy engineering evidence required for safety, certification, maintenance, or lifecycle accountability. These data categories shall be separated where possible.

## 86. Fail-Safe Architecture

Fail-Safe Architecture ensures that foreseeable BIOS, component, communication, power, configuration, or control failures produce a defined condition that minimizes harm.

Every safety-relevant function shall define:

normal state;

safe state;

degraded state;

failure-detection method;

transition trigger;

transition time;

local autonomous behavior;

manual override;

recovery conditions.

The safe state shall be hazard-specific. De-energized is not universally safe. A ventilation system, fire pump, emergency light, freeze-protection system, medical-support system, or access route may require continued or alternative operation.

The architecture shall address:

power loss;

communication loss;

BIOS Core failure;

sensor failure;

actuator failure;

storage corruption;

identity uncertainty;

state disagreement;

conflicting commands;

software crash;

cybersecurity compromise;

incomplete update.

Fail-safe behavior shall be implemented as close to the physical hazard as appropriate. Local controllers and physical interlocks shall not wait for remote BIOS or cloud instructions when immediate protective action is required.

Failure of status feedback shall not be interpreted as confirmation of the safe state.

Where no single universally safe state exists, the system shall implement a risk-prioritized emergency strategy and request human intervention.

Fail-safe functions shall be testable, and their test results shall be recorded.

## 87. Fault Containment

Fault Containment limits the spread of physical, electrical, fluid, digital, control, and security failures.

Containment boundaries may include:

Component;

Cartridge;

Interface;

room;

building zone;

utility branch;

network segment;

BIOS service;

BIOS node;

complete building.

The containment strategy shall identify:

initiating fault;

propagation paths;

affected dependencies;

isolation mechanism;

protected unaffected systems;

degraded operating condition;

restoration sequence.

Containment mechanisms may include:

structural isolation or temporary support;

electrical protective devices;

fluid shutoff;

fire and smoke barriers;

network segmentation;

process isolation;

service sandboxing;

credential revocation;

command blocking;

selective shutdown.

The BIOS shall use the Dependency Map to avoid containment actions that create a greater secondary hazard.

A compromised manufacturer service, occupant device, or experimental Cartridge shall be isolatable without disabling unrelated essential BIOS functions.

Fault containment shall preserve forensic and engineering evidence where possible. Isolation shall not erase the events required to determine cause.

After containment, the system shall verify that the boundary is effective and identify any residual risk.

Reintegration shall require confirmation that the cause has been removed and that affected components, credentials, configurations, and services remain trustworthy.

## 88. Offline Operation

The Building BIOS shall retain essential functionality without internet, cloud, manufacturer-server, or external AI connectivity.

Offline operation shall support, as applicable:

Building ID access;

authorized local login;

active Configuration Baseline;

Component, Cartridge, and Interface Registries;

essential topology and dependency data;

state and fault management;

local alarms;

safety and emergency information;

local control permissions;

maintenance access;

event recording;

backup and recovery;

operation of approved local automation.

The BIOS shall identify which functions become unavailable offline, such as:

remote monitoring;

cloud analytics;

offsite backup synchronization;

manufacturer diagnostic services;

remote AI processing;

external Registry updates;

nonessential remote control.

Loss of external connectivity shall not automatically unlock, shut down, or disable physical building systems unless required by their safety architecture.

Offline events shall be recorded locally with sequence and time-quality information. They shall be synchronized after connectivity returns without overwriting local history.

Cached credentials and authorization shall have defined offline validity. High-risk remote credentials shall not remain usable indefinitely without revalidation.

The BIOS shall provide a local method to obtain essential emergency, isolation, and recovery information.

Prolonged offline operation shall generate maintenance advisories where certificate status, software support, external hazard information, or backup replication can no longer be verified.

## 89. Emergency Operating Mode

Emergency Operating Mode coordinates BIOS behavior during conditions requiring immediate protection of occupants, responders, the building, or surrounding infrastructure.

Emergency conditions may include:

fire;

smoke;

gas release;

flood or major leakage;

structural damage;

electrical fault;

severe weather;

security threat;

hazardous environmental condition;

critical utility failure;

cyber-physical compromise.

Emergency Mode shall define:

initiating conditions;

activation authority;

automatic and manual triggers;

affected zones;

command priorities;

protected services;

disabled nonessential services;

resource priorities;

occupant notifications;

responder access;

data recording;

exit authority.

Dedicated certified safety systems shall retain their required autonomy. The BIOS shall coordinate with them without delaying their protective response.

Emergency commands shall supersede ordinary comfort, energy, scheduling, and optimization commands, but shall remain subject to physical safety constraints.

Emergency information shall remain locally accessible and may include:

building and zone identity;

current incident location;

utility shutoffs;

hazardous materials;

structural risk information;

emergency access routes;

active isolation;

affected Cartridges;

responder control points.

AI may assist with situational assessment but shall not conceal uncertainty or override certified emergency logic without explicit authority.

Exit from Emergency Mode shall require confirmation that the initiating condition is controlled, affected systems are inspected, temporary overrides are reviewed, and the building’s configuration and state are reconciled.

## 90. Incident Detection and Recovery

Incident Detection identifies events that threaten BIOS integrity, building safety, operational continuity, privacy, or configuration trust.

Incidents may include:

unauthorized access;

malware or compromised service;

credential theft;

configuration tampering;

denial of service;

abnormal command patterns;

identity duplication;

false sensor data;

unauthorized firmware;

physical tampering;

storage corruption;

repeated system failure;

loss of control authority;

unexplained configuration drift.

Detection may use:

authentication logs;

configuration-integrity checks;

network monitoring;

behavioral baselines;

event correlation;

driver and service health;

state inconsistencies;

physical tamper indicators;

dependency analysis;

external security advisories.

Each incident shall be classified by:

type;

severity;

affected scope;

confidence;

physical consequence;

data consequence;

operational consequence;

current containment status.

The incident-response process shall include:

detect;

validate;

classify;

preserve evidence;

contain;

maintain or establish safe physical operation;

revoke or restrict affected authority;

investigate;

remove the cause;

restore trusted software and configuration;

rotate affected credentials;

verify physical and digital states;

recommission affected functions;

monitor for recurrence;

document lessons and corrective actions.

Recovery shall use a verified trusted baseline. Restarting compromised software without removing the cause shall not constitute recovery.

Where physical actions may have occurred during compromise, the building shall be inspected and reconciled rather than assuming that restoration of digital configuration restored the physical state.

Incident closure shall identify:

root cause where known;

affected entities;

timeline;

evidence;

containment actions;

configuration changes;

credentials replaced;

systems recommissioned;

residual risk;

required governance or design changes.

## PART VII — Platform Integration

91. Interface Architecture Integration

The Building BIOS shall represent every System05 Interface through the Interface Abstraction Layer and the authoritative Interface Registry.

For each Interface, the BIOS shall maintain:

Interface Type and Instance IDs;

host entity;

location and orientation;

domain classification;

specification version;

Compatibility Class;

Interface Profile;

current connection;

current state;

Capability Declaration;

negotiated operating limits;

lock, seal, and isolation status;

inspection and maintenance status;

active faults and restrictions.

The BIOS shall use the Interface Protocol to coordinate:

discovery;

identity verification;

reservation;

compatibility verification;

alignment and engagement status;

locking verification;

capability negotiation;

commissioning;

operation;

isolation;

safe release;

disconnection.

The BIOS shall not represent a physical Interface as Operational solely because digital communication exists.

Interface state data may originate from:

embedded Interface sensors;

connected Cartridges;

installation tools;

robots;

inspection systems;

authorized human confirmation;

imported commissioning evidence.

The source and verification level shall remain attached to each state.

The BIOS shall detect inconsistencies between the two Interface sides. If one side reports Locked while the other reports Partially Engaged, the connection shall enter a State Conflict or Faulted condition.

Passive Interfaces shall be represented using registered geometry, installation evidence, inspection, and lifecycle records even when no live electronic state is available.

## 92. Cartridge Architecture Integration

Every System05 Cartridge shall be integrated into the BIOS as a uniquely identified, replaceable, capability-bearing engineering asset.

The BIOS shall retrieve or store:

Cartridge Type and Instance identity;

Cartridge Digital Passport;

Cartridge classification;

manufacturer and version;

host-side and service-side Interfaces;

physical location;

installation orientation;

Capability Declaration;

operational requirements;

dependencies;

configuration;

firmware and software;

commissioning status;

lifecycle state;

maintenance requirements;

safety limitations.

Cartridge integration shall follow:

discovery;

authentication;

Registry comparison;

assigned-location verification;

Interface compatibility verification;

dependency validation;

capability negotiation;

commissioning;

permission assignment;

operational activation.

The BIOS shall distinguish between a Cartridge being:

physically present;

registered;

connected;

commissioned;

authorized;

operational.

Replacing a Cartridge shall trigger:

dependency analysis;

safe disconnection;

removal of the previous Instance from the active topology;

verification of the replacement;

configuration update;

recommissioning;

Digital Twin reconciliation;

lifecycle recording.

A replacement Cartridge may come from a different manufacturer if it satisfies the required Interface, capacity, Profile, certification, and lifecycle requirements.

The BIOS shall not permit a Smart or Control Cartridge to obtain broader authority than its declared and approved function.

## 93. Building Definition Language Integration

Building Definition Language, or BDL, shall provide the formal declarative language through which the intended structure, composition, Interfaces, capabilities, dependencies, Profiles, and constraints of a System05 building are described.

BDL represents what the building is intended to be. Building BIOS represents what is installed, verified, configured, and currently authorized.

The BDL model may define:

building identity and use;

spatial hierarchy;

structural topology;

required component Types;

Node and Interface relationships;

Cartridge locations;

required capabilities;

utility topology;

dependency requirements;

Engineering Profiles;

safety constraints;

permitted substitutions;

commissioning requirements;

future-reserved Interfaces.

The BIOS shall not execute unvalidated BDL source directly. BDL shall pass through the Engineering Compiler and produce a signed, validated configuration package.

The BIOS shall maintain traceability between:

BDL element identity;

compiled configuration object;

physical Component or Cartridge Instance;

Interface Instance;

commissioning evidence;

current Digital Twin object.

The BIOS shall report deviations from the compiled BDL intent, including:

missing component;

substituted type;

changed location;

incompatible Interface;

insufficient capability;

additional unplanned component;

modified dependency;

changed Engineering Profile.

Field changes shall not rewrite the original BDL silently. They shall create a proposed model revision or a documented As-Built deviation.

BDL schema versions and BIOS-supported configuration schema versions shall be explicitly mapped.

## 94. Engineering Compiler Integration

The Engineering Compiler transforms BDL and associated engineering inputs into a validated configuration package suitable for review, approval, and BIOS deployment.

Compiler inputs may include:

BDL source;

component and Cartridge Type definitions;

Digital Interface Descriptors;

Engineering Profiles;

site and climate data;

code and regulatory requirements;

structural and utility models;

manufacturer constraints;

project-specific rules;

approved exceptions.

Compiler outputs shall include:

compiled Building Manifest;

expected registries;

topology graphs;

Interface Connection Map;

Dependency Map;

required Capability Map;

configuration rules;

commissioning requirements;

identified conflicts;

evidence references;

machine-readable deployment package;

human-readable engineering report.

The Compiler shall perform:

schema validation;

identity and reference checking;

Interface compatibility checking;

capability sufficiency checking;

dependency validation;

Profile validation;

topology analysis;

configuration consistency checking;

rule evaluation;

evidence completeness checking.

A successful compilation means that the proposed configuration satisfies the implemented validation rules. It shall not replace physical testing, professional engineering review, regulatory approval, or site commissioning.

The compiled configuration package shall be versioned and signed before BIOS activation.

The BIOS shall verify that the package:

applies to the correct Building ID;

uses supported schemas;

has valid signatures;

references recognized Types and Profiles;

has not been altered;

satisfies local activation policy.

Compiler warnings, unresolved assumptions, and required site verifications shall remain visible during commissioning.

## 95. Digital Twin Integration

The Building BIOS and Digital Twin shall maintain a controlled exchange of identity, configuration, state, geometry, and lifecycle information.

The BIOS shall remain authoritative for:

active Configuration Baseline;

registered identities;

permissions;

Interface connection state;

commissioned capabilities;

operating restrictions;

BIOS-managed events;

current authorization.

The Digital Twin may remain authoritative for:

detailed geometric representation;

simulation models;

visualization;

performance analysis;

predictive models;

historical analysis;

engineering scenarios.

The integration shall distinguish:

As-Designed;

As-Manufactured;

As-Installed;

As-Commissioned;

As-Operated;

As-Maintained;

As-Modified;

As-Decommissioned.

Data exchanged may include:

Component and Cartridge identities;

locations and coordinate transformations;

Interface relationships;

capabilities;

state and health;

faults;

maintenance history;

sensor data references;

configuration versions;

simulation results;

predicted degradation.

Digital Twin predictions shall not overwrite BIOS-observed or verified states.

A discrepancy shall create a reconciliation record identifying:

BIOS value;

Digital Twin value;

source;

authority;

confidence;

required verification;

proposed resolution.

Physical change shall not be considered complete merely because a Digital Twin model was edited. Digital change shall not be considered physically implemented without BIOS-recognized verification.

## 96. AI Architecture Integration

AI systems may use BIOS data to support engineering analysis, operation, diagnosis, optimization, maintenance, occupant assistance, and emergency decision support.

The BIOS shall provide AI systems only with authorized, structured, provenance-preserving data.

AI inputs may include:

verified building configuration;

topology and dependencies;

Component and Cartridge capabilities;

Interface states;

event history;

health data;

sensor data;

maintenance records;

operating mode;

active restrictions;

applicable Engineering Profiles.

AI outputs may include:

recommendations;

anomaly detections;

predicted faults;

optimization proposals;

maintenance priorities;

configuration alternatives;

diagnostic hypotheses;

natural-language explanations;

proposed commands.

The BIOS shall classify AI outputs as inferred or recommended information unless they have been independently verified and formally accepted.

AI shall not directly modify:

Configuration Baseline;

Engineering Profiles;

safety logic;

control-authority assignments;

certification data;

structural capacity;

emergency rules.

Any AI-proposed change shall pass through normal authorization, validation, and Configuration Change Management.

AI systems shall declare:

model identity and version;

provider;

intended function;

required inputs;

output type;

confidence or uncertainty;

known limitations;

permitted authority;

data-retention behavior.

Loss or failure of AI services shall not eliminate essential BIOS functions.

## 97. AI Agent Access

Each AI agent interacting with the BIOS shall possess a unique service identity and a defined authorization scope.

AI agent access levels may include:

read public information;

read approved engineering configuration;

read selected operational data;

generate recommendations;

request diagnostic tests;

propose configuration changes;

request operational commands;

issue limited commands within approved constraints;

emergency advisory access.

An AI agent shall not receive general administrative privileges.

Each agent authorization shall define:

agent identity;

model and service version;

responsible organization;

approved purpose;

accessible entities;

accessible data categories;

permitted actions;

maximum command scope;

required human confirmation;

validity period;

revocation conditions;

logging requirements.

AI agents shall not impersonate human users. Every request, recommendation, or command shall remain attributable to the specific agent and supervising authority.

Where an AI agent can request physical action, the BIOS shall verify:

current building state;

agent authority;

target identity;

command limits;

applicable interlocks;

dependency status;

operating mode;

required human approval.

The BIOS shall record:

data supplied to the agent;

relevant model version;

output received;

confidence where provided;

action taken or rejected;

approving human or service;

resulting physical state.

Privacy-sensitive and security-sensitive data shall not be exposed merely because the agent may improve its recommendations.

## 98. Building Management System Integration

A Building Management System, or BMS, may supervise and control mechanical, electrical, energy, environmental, and operational building systems through BIOS-authorized services.

The BMS shall normally manage:

HVAC operation;

energy management;

equipment scheduling;

utility monitoring;

environmental control;

operational alarms;

system optimization.

The BIOS shall remain responsible for:

identity;

authoritative configuration;

Interface and Cartridge registration;

control authority;

state and event integrity;

permissions;

configuration validation;

BIOS recovery.

The BMS shall receive from the BIOS:

authorized equipment list;

topology and zone information;

available capabilities;

current restrictions;

operating mode;

command permissions;

dependency status;

relevant faults.

The BMS shall return:

commands;

operating states;

measurements;

alarms;

performance data;

equipment faults;

maintenance indicators.

A BMS command shall not bypass BIOS permissions, certified local controllers, safety interlocks, or equipment limits.

Replacement of the BMS shall not require reconstruction of the building’s identity and configuration records.

Proprietary BMS objects shall be mapped to persistent System05 identities. Loss of that BMS shall not cause Components or Cartridges to lose their Registry identities.

## 99. Home Automation Integration

Home Automation systems may provide occupant-facing control of lighting, climate preferences, shading, appliances, entertainment, access, scenes, and schedules.

Home Automation shall operate as a higher-level convenience and interaction layer, not as the authoritative Building BIOS.

The BIOS shall define which occupant-facing functions may be exposed and under what limits.

Home Automation permissions may include:

read environmental status;

request lighting changes;

request temperature setpoints;

operate approved shades or doors;

activate approved scenes;

receive noncritical notifications;

query equipment status.

Home Automation shall not automatically receive permission to:

modify the Building Manifest;

enroll safety-critical Cartridges;

release structural Interfaces;

disable required alarms;

modify engineering limits;

access unrelated private data;

override emergency commands;

alter BIOS trust configuration.

Occupant preferences shall remain subordinate to safety, resource, maintenance, and emergency policies.

Consumer devices shall be isolated from BIOS Core and critical networks. Their compromise shall not provide direct access to safety, structural, utility, or administrative functions.

Removal or replacement of a Home Automation platform shall not prevent manual operation of essential building functions.

Local occupant control shall remain available where practical during internet or vendor-cloud outage.

100. Robotic Systems Integration

Robotic systems may use BIOS services to perform manufacturing support, transport, installation, inspection, maintenance, replacement, and emergency assessment.

Every robot shall possess:

unique identity;

registered tool and capability set;

current software version;

task authorization;

operating zone;

access duration;

safety classification;

human-supervision requirement.

Before robotic action, the BIOS shall provide an authorized task package containing:

target identity;

target location and coordinate system;

expected configuration;

Interface Descriptor;

approach and exclusion envelopes;

mass and handling information;

permitted grasp zones;

connection or release sequence;

force, torque, and motion limits;

interlocks;

verification requirements;

recovery instructions.

The robot shall return:

observed identity;

actual pose;

task progress;

force and torque records;

lock or release evidence;

inspection data;

faults;

final physical state.

The BIOS shall not assume task completion from robot trajectory alone. Required physical outcomes shall be verified.

Robot authority shall be limited to the approved task, zone, time, and equipment.

Human presence, emergency stop, unexpected obstruction, identity mismatch, excessive force, communication loss, or state conflict shall trigger defined stop or recovery behavior.

Robotic actions affecting building configuration shall create events and trigger model reconciliation.

101. API Architecture

The BIOS API Architecture shall provide documented, versioned, secure, and vendor-neutral access to approved BIOS services.

API domains shall include:

Building Identity API;

Registry API;

Configuration API;

State API;

Event API;

Capability API;

Topology API;

Compatibility API;

Commissioning API;

Diagnostics API;

Fault and Alarm API;

Control Authority API;

Command API;

Maintenance API;

Digital Passport API;

Robotics API;

Emergency Information API.

Every API operation shall define:

operation identity;

requesting identity;

required permission;

input schema;

output schema;

units;

coordinate system;

target configuration version;

expected state;

timeout;

error behavior;

audit requirement.

Read, recommend, request, command, configure, approve, override, and administer operations shall remain distinct.

A response indicating that a command was accepted shall not be interpreted as confirmation that the physical action occurred.

APIs affecting configuration shall support transactional behavior, conflict detection, and version checking.

The BIOS shall reject:

malformed requests;

unsupported versions;

unauthorized operations;

stale commands;

state-incompatible commands;

ambiguous target identities;

commands violating interlocks.

API extensions may be proprietary, but required System05 functions shall remain available through standardized interfaces.

102. Edge and Cloud Integration

The Building BIOS shall support edge and cloud services without making essential building operation dependent upon continuous external connectivity.

Local edge services may provide:

protocol translation;

local analytics;

AI inference;

data aggregation;

temporary storage;

video processing;

robotic coordination;

manufacturer-device gateways.

Cloud services may provide:

remote monitoring;

long-term analytics;

offsite backup;

fleet-level comparison;

manufacturer support;

advanced AI;

certification or Registry access;

software distribution;

collaborative engineering.

The BIOS shall define:

data allowed to leave the building;

external service identity;

permitted purpose;

retention;

geographic or jurisdictional restrictions where required;

command authority;

offline behavior;

revocation procedure.

Essential local functions shall include:

active Configuration Baseline;

identity and Registry access;

state and fault management;

local authorization;

emergency information;

safe operation;

recovery access.

Cloud commands shall be treated as remote requests subject to local BIOS validation, current state, interlocks, and authority.

Loss of cloud service shall not erase local data or permanently disable paid-for physical functionality unless the limitation is explicit, lawful, technically justified, and accepted before installation.

Migration between cloud providers shall be supported through documented export of essential System05 data.

103. Legacy Building Integration

Legacy Building Integration enables existing buildings and non-System05 systems to participate in the BIOS architecture through controlled representation and adapters.

Legacy integration may use:

physical Interface adapters;

protocol gateways;

sensor retrofits;

manually registered components;

imported drawings and asset lists;

temporary identifiers;

inspection-derived topology;

utility monitoring;

digital proxy objects.

Each legacy entity shall be assigned:

provisional or verified identity;

known Type or descriptive class;

location;

observed Interfaces;

known capabilities;

unknown properties;

condition;

evidence source;

confidence;

restrictions.

The BIOS shall distinguish:

verified fact;

manufacturer information;

field measurement;

engineering assumption;

inference;

unknown condition.

A digital gateway shall not create physical compatibility or safety evidence that the legacy system does not possess.

Legacy systems with insecure protocols shall be segmented and provided only the minimum required communication and control access.

Legacy adapters shall be registered as separate Components or Cartridges with their own Interfaces, limitations, inspection requirements, and failure behavior.

Integration may progress through maturity levels:

documentation only;

identity and location registration;

monitored state;

controlled gateway access;

replaceable System05 adapter;

partial System05 conversion;

full compatible replacement.

Unknown legacy conditions shall remain visible and shall not be silently assigned standard System05 capabilities.

104. Emergency Responder Interface

The Emergency Responder Interface shall provide authorized responders with rapid access to essential building information and approved emergency controls.

The interface shall remain locally accessible during:

internet outage;

cloud-service failure;

partial BIOS failure;

power interruption;

normal user-system unavailability.

Emergency information may include:

Building ID and address;

building layout;

occupancy and access information where authorized;

structural system summary;

damaged or restricted zones;

electrical disconnect locations;

gas and fluid shutoffs;

fire-suppression systems;

hazardous-material locations;

energy-storage systems;

utility topology;

emergency access routes;

responder control points;

active alarms;

isolated systems;

current Emergency Operating Mode.

Emergency control may include authorized requests to:

isolate selected utilities;

release designated responder access;

activate emergency lighting;

obtain live safety-system status;

disable approved nonessential equipment;

communicate with building occupants;

identify structurally restricted areas.

Emergency access shall be authenticated where practical, but the architecture shall account for situations in which ordinary credentials or communications are unavailable.

Publicly accessible emergency information shall be limited to what is necessary and shall not expose avoidable security or personal data.

Emergency actions shall be recorded with:

responder identity or access method;

time;

requested action;

affected system;

resulting verified state;

unresolved failure.

The responder interface shall not imply that the BIOS is the sole emergency-control path. Dedicated physical controls and legally required emergency systems shall remain available and authoritative.

## PART VIII — BIOS Lifecycle & Evolution

105. BIOS Provisioning

BIOS Provisioning establishes the initial trusted identity, ownership context, configuration authority, and deployment package required for a Building BIOS instance.

Provisioning shall occur before the BIOS receives operational control authority.

The provisioning package shall include:

Building ID or authorized process for creating it;

BIOS hardware identity;

BIOS software and Core version;

Root-of-Trust configuration;

initial trust authorities;

owner or project authority;

initial administrator identities;

approved Building Manifest;

applicable Engineering Profiles;

initial configuration schema;

recovery authorities;

backup policy;

commissioning requirements.

Provisioning shall distinguish among:

BIOS platform provisioning;

building-specific provisioning;

user and service provisioning;

Component and Cartridge pre-enrollment;

certificate and credential provisioning;

recovery provisioning.

The process shall verify that the BIOS platform has not been altered between manufacture, delivery, and site activation.

Factory default credentials shall not remain active after building-specific provisioning.

Provisioning records shall identify:

who performed the action;

where it occurred;

hardware and software involved;

credentials created;

ownership authority;

configuration package;

verification results;

unresolved restrictions.

A BIOS may be pre-provisioned for a specific project or provisioned onsite. In either case, final activation shall verify that the hardware, Building ID, site, configuration, and responsible authority correspond.

Recovery credentials shall be created and protected during provisioning rather than improvised after a failure.

106. Factory Configuration

Factory Configuration prepares BIOS hardware, prefabricated building assemblies, Cartridges, gateways, and controllers before shipment to the construction site.

Factory Configuration may include:

installation of approved BIOS software;

secure boot configuration;

device and Cartridge identities;

communication settings;

initial Interface Descriptors;

factory topology for prefabricated assemblies;

calibration data;

factory test results;

firmware versions;

temporary commissioning credentials;

project-specific assignments;

shipping and storage state.

Factory Configuration shall not falsely declare site-dependent relationships as verified. Building location, final Interface engagement, field utility connection, and complete topology shall remain uncommissioned until verified onsite.

Every factory-configured item shall be linked to:

Component or Cartridge Instance ID;

manufacturing batch;

factory identity;

configuration version;

software and firmware versions;

test equipment and calibration;

responsible personnel or automated system;

release status.

Temporary factory credentials shall expire or be replaced during site enrollment.

Factory Configuration shall support import into the site BIOS without uncontrolled manual re-entry.

Any change made after factory testing shall trigger evaluation of affected test evidence.

The factory package shall distinguish:

manufacturer-controlled configuration;

project-controlled configuration;

site-required configuration;

installer-adjustable settings;

prohibited field modifications.

107. Site Installation

Site Installation places the BIOS hardware, communication infrastructure, local service interfaces, and supporting equipment into their approved building locations.

Before installation, the responsible party shall verify:

BIOS hardware identity;

shipping condition;

tamper status;

approved location;

environmental conditions;

primary and backup power;

grounding;

communication paths;

physical security;

service access;

recovery access;

compatibility with the provisioned building package.

The installation shall define:

enclosure and mounting;

ventilation and temperature control;

moisture and dust protection;

electrical supply and isolation;

battery or backup power;

network connections;

physical access control;

labeling;

emergency identification;

replacement clearance.

The BIOS shall not be located where a single foreseeable water leak, fire event, impact, environmental condition, or unauthorized access can unnecessarily disable both primary operation and recovery.

Redundant BIOS nodes shall avoid common physical failure conditions where required.

Site Installation shall record:

actual location;

installed hardware;

connected power and networks;

physical-protection measures;

installation date;

installer identity;

deviations;

inspection results;

photographs or scans where required.

Physical installation shall place the BIOS into an Installed—Not Commissioned state.

108. Initial Commissioning

Initial Commissioning verifies that the installed BIOS platform, building configuration, connected assets, trust system, and essential services operate correctly together.

Commissioning shall include:

hardware identity verification;

secure boot verification;

power and backup-power testing;

persistent storage testing;

local service-access testing;

communication-network testing;

clock and synchronization verification;

trust and credential verification;

Building Manifest import;

Registry initialization;

Component and Cartridge discovery;

Interface verification;

topology construction;

configuration validation;

service dependency testing;

state and event testing;

alarm and notification testing;

backup and restore testing;

Safe Boot testing;

authorized integration testing.

Commissioning shall verify actual physical conditions rather than configuration files alone.

The commissioning record shall identify:

tests performed;

expected and actual results;

test equipment;

configuration version;

responsible parties;

defects and corrective actions;

accepted restrictions;

unresolved conditions;

approval status.

Initial commissioning results may be:

accepted;

accepted with restrictions;

conditionally accepted;

rejected;

limited to construction or maintenance operation.

The first As-Commissioned Configuration Baseline shall be created only after the required commissioning criteria are satisfied.

109. Operational Management

Operational Management maintains the BIOS in a known, secure, healthy, and supportable condition throughout building use.

Operational activities shall include:

BIOS health monitoring;

service availability monitoring;

storage and backup verification;

configuration-drift monitoring;

credential-status monitoring;

software-support monitoring;

Registry maintenance;

event and fault review;

capacity monitoring;

integration-status monitoring;

recovery-readiness verification.

The BIOS shall provide authorized operators with:

current operating mode;

BIOS integrity status;

active configuration version;

unavailable services;

degraded Components and Cartridges;

active alarms and faults;

pending maintenance;

backup condition;

update status;

certification and support status.

Routine operational management shall not require unrestricted access to safety-critical or engineering configuration.

Temporary overrides, maintenance permissions, and remote-service sessions shall expire automatically according to their approved duration.

Operational procedures shall define response to:

repeated restart;

storage degradation;

expired credentials;

unavailable cloud services;

lost Component communication;

configuration drift;

unsupported software;

certificate revocation;

failed backup;

degraded redundancy.

Operational records shall remain attributable to the responsible user or service.

110. Inspection and Diagnostics

The BIOS shall undergo periodic and condition-triggered inspection to confirm that its physical installation, hardware, software, configuration, security, and recovery functions remain suitable for service.

Inspection shall include, as applicable:

enclosure and mounting;

environmental condition;

physical tamper evidence;

power and backup power;

grounding;

communication connections;

storage health;

clock accuracy;

secure boot status;

software integrity;

credential validity;

active services;

configuration integrity;

backup validity;

recovery-interface accessibility;

event and audit logging;

integration health.

Diagnostic testing may include:

processor and memory tests;

storage-integrity tests;

redundant-node failover;

network-path tests;

service restart;

configuration validation;

authentication tests;

alarm-delivery tests;

Safe Boot;

backup restoration in an isolated environment.

Inspection frequency shall reflect:

building criticality;

BIOS architecture;

hardware environment;

previous faults;

software support;

regulatory requirements;

consequence of BIOS unavailability.

Testing shall not create unsafe physical commands or disrupt required services without an approved procedure.

The inspection result shall classify the BIOS as:

acceptable;

acceptable with advisory;

maintenance required;

degraded;

restricted;

immediate recovery required;

unsuitable for continued authoritative operation.

111. Maintenance

BIOS Maintenance preserves or restores hardware, software, communication, storage, security, and recovery capability without altering the approved building function unnecessarily.

Maintenance may include:

cleaning;

environmental-control service;

backup-battery replacement;

storage replacement;

communication-module replacement;

clock-battery replacement;

credential rotation;

log archival;

backup verification;

service repair;

driver repair;

approved security patching;

recovery-media renewal.

Before maintenance, the BIOS shall identify:

affected services;

dependent systems;

required operating mode;

redundancy availability;

configuration checkpoint;

recovery plan;

maintenance authority.

Maintenance shall follow a controlled work order containing:

task;

target;

approved parts or software;

isolation requirements;

expected duration;

verification procedure;

rollback procedure;

responsible person.

Substitute hardware shall meet the required environmental, security, reliability, communication, and performance characteristics.

Maintenance affecting trust, persistent storage, Core services, network segmentation, or command authority shall require enhanced verification.

After maintenance, the BIOS shall perform:

integrity checking;

service health verification;

configuration validation;

communication verification;

affected integration testing;

backup verification;

event recording.

Maintenance shall not silently reset configuration, delete logs, re-enable revoked access, or restore insecure defaults.

112. Configuration Update

A Configuration Update changes the approved representation or operating rules of the building without necessarily changing BIOS software.

Configuration Updates may include:

adding or removing a Component;

replacing a Cartridge;

changing an Interface connection;

modifying a spatial assignment;

changing a dependency;

changing an Engineering Profile;

updating a capacity or operating limit;

changing control authority;

changing an operating mode;

accepting an As-Built condition.

Every Configuration Update shall include:

proposed change;

affected configuration objects;

engineering rationale;

compatibility assessment;

dependency impact;

safety and security impact;

required evidence;

implementation sequence;

validation procedure;

commissioning requirements;

recovery plan;

approval.

The update shall be applied transactionally.

The BIOS shall:

preserve the current baseline;

validate the proposed package;

verify authority and signatures;

identify affected entities;

establish required operating state;

apply the proposed configuration in a controlled context;

verify physical implementation;

validate the resulting configuration;

recommission affected functions;

activate the new baseline;

record the complete change.

If activation fails, the BIOS shall return to a safe condition. Rollback shall occur only where the preceding physical configuration remains valid.

113. Firmware and Software Update

Firmware and Software Update modifies executable code operating within the BIOS platform, connected controllers, or registered Cartridges.

Updates shall be classified as:

security;

defect correction;

compatibility;

performance;

functional;

safety-related;

major platform migration.

The update package shall identify:

publisher;

target;

current and proposed versions;

digital signature;

integrity value;

dependencies;

compatibility;

configuration effect;

known risks;

installation requirements;

restart requirements;

rollback or recovery;

required testing.

The BIOS shall reject unauthorized, corrupted, incompatible, revoked, or improperly targeted updates.

Updates shall not proceed when:

emergency operation is active;

required backup is invalid;

recovery capacity is unavailable;

insufficient power exists;

affected redundancy is already lost;

configuration is inconsistent;

required authorization is absent.

Where practical, new software shall be installed into an inactive partition or isolated environment and verified before activation.

Following activation, the BIOS shall confirm:

secure boot;

software integrity;

service availability;

Registry access;

configuration compatibility;

communication;

safety-related functions;

event recording;

recovery readiness.

Update failure shall produce a defined recovery state rather than repeated uncontrolled restart.

114. Hardware Migration

Hardware Migration transfers BIOS authority from an existing computing platform to replacement or upgraded hardware while preserving Building ID, configuration, trust, and lifecycle continuity.

Migration may be required because of:

hardware failure;

capacity expansion;

technology obsolescence;

cybersecurity improvement;

manufacturer withdrawal;

environmental damage;

planned modernization.

The migration process shall include:

register and verify the new hardware;

establish a trusted migration relationship;

confirm software and schema compatibility;

create a current verified backup;

transfer configuration and authorized records;

transfer or replace credentials;

validate restored data;

synchronize state and event records;

test network and integration services;

transfer authoritative role;

isolate the old platform;

monitor the new platform;

revoke or decommission old credentials.

The Building ID shall not change merely because BIOS hardware changes.

Private credentials that cannot be securely transferred shall be replaced through an authorized trust-transition process.

Parallel operation during migration shall define which platform is authoritative. Both platforms shall not issue conflicting configuration or command authority.

Migration shall include Safe Boot, backup restore, and failover testing where required.

The old hardware shall be sanitized, archived, retained as an approved recovery device, or decommissioned according to its classification.

115. Building Expansion and Reconfiguration

The BIOS shall support physical expansion, renovation, subsystem replacement, change of use, and building-zone reconfiguration.

Expansion may introduce:

new spatial zones;

structural components;

Nodes;

Interfaces;

Cartridges;

utility capacity;

networks;

BIOS nodes;

Engineering Profiles;

new dependencies;

new safety systems.

The process shall begin with a proposed BDL or configuration model identifying:

existing configuration;

proposed additions or removals;

temporary construction states;

affected Interfaces;

resource requirements;

dependency changes;

capacity effects;

safety and regulatory impacts;

commissioning phases.

The Engineering Compiler shall evaluate the proposed configuration where applicable.

Temporary construction configurations shall be represented explicitly. The BIOS shall not assume that the building moves directly from the old complete state to the new complete state.

Phased work shall define:

intermediate baselines;

temporary supports;

utility bypasses;

isolated areas;

reduced capabilities;

temporary alarms;

permitted occupancy;

rollback or recovery.

New BIOS nodes or network segments shall be enrolled and coordinated without creating conflicting authority.

After expansion, the BIOS shall reconstruct topology, update registries, validate dependencies, recommission affected systems, and create a new As-Modified Baseline.

116. Disaster Recovery

Disaster Recovery restores essential BIOS authority and building configuration following severe physical, digital, environmental, or organizational disruption.

Disaster scenarios may include:

fire;

flood;

structural damage;

total power loss;

BIOS hardware destruction;

storage loss;

cyberattack;

credential compromise;

communication failure;

loss of vendor services;

unauthorized configuration change.

The Disaster Recovery Plan shall define:

critical BIOS functions;

recovery priorities;

backup locations;

replacement hardware;

trusted recovery software;

recovery authorities;

emergency credentials;

offline documentation;

maximum acceptable data loss;

maximum acceptable recovery time;

temporary operating modes.

Recovery shall proceed through:

establish physical safety;

determine BIOS and infrastructure condition;

isolate compromised systems;

establish trusted recovery hardware;

verify recovery authority;

retrieve and validate backups;

assess physical changes since the backup;

restore essential configuration;

rediscover Components and Interfaces;

reconcile the physical building;

validate dependencies;

recommission critical systems;

restore additional services by priority;

create a recovery baseline.

Disaster Recovery shall not assume that the pre-disaster physical topology remains intact.

Essential emergency information shall be available independently of the primary BIOS where required.

Recovery plans and backups shall be tested periodically through exercises or isolated restoration.

117. Decommissioning

BIOS Decommissioning permanently removes a BIOS implementation, BIOS node, or complete building BIOS from authorized service.

Decommissioning may occur because of:

hardware replacement;

building demolition;

building conversion;

migration to another compliant implementation;

irreparable compromise;

end of support;

permanent shutdown.

The decommissioning process shall include:

confirm scope and authority;

preserve the final Configuration Baseline;

export required Registries and lifecycle records;

archive evidence and audit logs;

transfer authority where applicable;

revoke credentials;

remove remote access;

disable update and support services;

sanitize protected data;

remove or classify hardware;

update the Building Manifest;

record final state.

If the building remains in operation under a replacement BIOS, authority shall transfer before the old BIOS is disabled.

If the complete building is decommissioned, the BIOS shall create an As-Decommissioned model showing:

Components removed;

Cartridges transferred;

materials recovered;

hazardous systems;

remaining physical assets;

final utility isolation;

final lifecycle states.

Building identity and historical records shall not be reassigned to another building.

Decommissioned hardware shall not retain active credentials that permit future access.

118. Evidence and Traceability

Every significant BIOS claim, decision, configuration, state transition, and lifecycle action shall be linked to appropriate evidence.

Evidence may include:

design records;

signed configuration;

manufacturer documentation;

certificates;

test results;

commissioning records;

physical inspection;

sensor measurement;

diagnostic output;

software-integrity records;

authentication records;

human approval;

robotic installation records;

photographs or scans;

AI-supported analysis.

Each evidence item shall identify:

Evidence ID;

subject;

claim supported;

evidence type;

source;

author or producing system;

date;

configuration and software version;

method;

result;

uncertainty;

limitations;

integrity information;

retention requirement.

The BIOS shall distinguish among:

declared evidence;

calculated evidence;

simulated evidence;

tested evidence;

inspected evidence;

monitored evidence;

inferred evidence;

independently certified evidence.

Traceability shall connect:

constitutional requirement;

technical specification;

Engineering Profile;

BDL element;

compiled configuration;

physical Instance;

Interface connection;

commissioning test;

operational event;

maintenance action;

current state.

Evidence shall not be reused for a materially different configuration without an applicability assessment.

Historical evidence shall remain linked to the exact versions and physical Instances it evaluated.

119. Conformance Testing

Conformance Testing determines whether a Building BIOS implementation satisfies its declared System05 BIOS specification, deployment Profile, security class, and operational requirements.

Testing shall include, as applicable:

architecture review;

secure boot testing;

identity and authentication testing;

authorization testing;

Registry testing;

Interface and Cartridge integration;

configuration validation;

state-transition testing;

event integrity;

fault management;

API conformance;

network segmentation;

offline operation;

backup and restore;

failover;

Safe Boot;

update and rollback;

hardware migration;

emergency operation;

performance and capacity;

cybersecurity;

long-duration reliability.

Testing shall evaluate normal, degraded, fault, recovery, and hostile conditions.

Reference test configurations shall include products or simulated entities from multiple manufacturers where interoperability is claimed.

Conformance testing shall verify that the BIOS:

rejects invalid identity;

rejects unauthorized commands;

detects incompatible configuration;

preserves transactional integrity;

distinguishes requested and verified physical state;

continues required local functions offline;

restores a valid configuration;

records failures without silent deletion.

Test plans shall define:

test environment;

BIOS version;

configuration;

input conditions;

expected result;

acceptance criteria;

tools;

uncertainty;

responsible laboratory;

deviations.

Passing a test suite shall not establish compliance for functions outside the tested scope.

120. BIOS Certification

BIOS Certification is the formal determination that a defined BIOS implementation or deployment satisfies specified System05 requirements.

Certification may apply to:

BIOS Core software;

physical BIOS hardware;

complete hardware-software platform;

deployment architecture;

security implementation;

communication gateway;

recovery process;

installation organization;

complete building-specific BIOS deployment.

The certification record shall identify:

certified product or deployment;

hardware;

software and firmware versions;

Configuration Schema versions;

supported Interface and Cartridge classes;

deployment limits;

building-scale limits;

security and availability classification;

tests and evidence;

excluded functions;

issuing authority;

validity period;

surveillance requirements.

Certification levels shall reflect the consequence of BIOS failure and the authority assigned to the implementation.

A BIOS used only for identity and documentation may require a different certification level from a BIOS coordinating safety-related commands or high-criticality buildings.

Changes affecting trusted boot, authorization, configuration processing, state logic, safety behavior, update architecture, or recovery may require recertification.

Certification shall not replace:

project-specific engineering;

regulatory approval;

commissioning;

physical safety certification;

licensed professional responsibility.

Suspended, expired, or withdrawn certification shall remain visible in the Registry and shall trigger defined operational review.

121. BIOS Governance

BIOS Governance controls the development, approval, publication, implementation, revision, and retirement of Building BIOS specifications.

Governance shall preserve:

safety;

vendor neutrality;

interoperability;

transparency;

cybersecurity;

recoverability;

human accountability;

regional adaptability;

long-term data access.

Governance responsibilities shall include:

BIOS constitutional consistency;

Core architecture;

data schemas;

API standards;

identity and trust;

security requirements;

configuration semantics;

state and event models;

certification requirements;

reference implementations;

deprecation policy.

A BIOS proposal or major revision shall proceed through:

problem definition;

use-case analysis;

threat and hazard analysis;

architectural proposal;

compatibility review;

prototype;

test implementation;

security review;

interoperability testing;

public or authorized technical review;

controlled pilot;

approval;

publication;

operational monitoring.

No single BIOS vendor shall unilaterally redefine universal configuration semantics or required APIs.

Security-sensitive details may receive restricted distribution, but their governance, authority, and audit status shall remain traceable.

Emergency security or safety revisions may use accelerated approval while preserving documentation, scope, transition requirements, and later review.

122. Versioning and Compatibility

Every BIOS architecture, implementation, schema, API, policy package, driver, Interface Descriptor, and configuration package shall be versioned.

Version changes shall be classified as:

Major: introduces breaking compatibility or changes authoritative behavior;

Minor: adds compatible functions;

Patch: corrects defects without intentionally changing external behavior;

Security Revision: addresses a security risk and may impose accelerated migration;

Profile Revision: changes deployment-specific requirements.

The BIOS shall declare:

supported configuration-schema versions;

supported BDL and Compiler outputs;

supported Interface Descriptor versions;

supported Cartridge Passport versions;

supported API versions;

supported driver versions;

supported security protocols.

Backward compatibility shall permit a newer BIOS to operate approved older configurations within declared limits.

Forward compatibility shall allow older deployments to reject or safely ignore unknown optional capabilities without misinterpreting them.

Unknown critical fields, states, commands, or safety requirements shall cause rejection rather than silent omission.

Compatibility shall be verified before:

BIOS update;

hardware migration;

Configuration Update;

new Cartridge enrollment;

new integration service;

restore from backup.

Version support shall include documented start, maintenance, deprecation, and end-of-support dates.

123. Evolution and Deprecation

Building BIOS shall evolve without abandoning installed buildings or creating unnecessary vendor lock-in.

Evolution may be driven by:

new Interface and Cartridge generations;

security threats;

improved safety;

new regulations;

AI and robotic capabilities;

new building types;

operating experience;

incident findings;

technology obsolescence.

The preferred evolution strategy shall be:

add optional compatible capability;

add a new Profile;

extend a schema safely;

introduce a compatible Minor version;

provide a migration tool;

introduce a Major version when necessary;

maintain transition support;

deprecate obsolete or unsafe versions;

withdraw versions only when continued use is unacceptable.

BIOS lifecycle status may include:

experimental;

draft;

approved;

active;

mature;

maintenance-only;

deprecated;

unsupported;

withdrawn.

A deprecation notice shall identify:

affected versions;

reason;

risk;

effective date;

continued-use conditions;

available updates;

hardware requirements;

migration procedure;

backup requirements;

certification effect;

support period.

Deprecation shall not erase building records or make essential data inaccessible.

Where hardware cannot support a required secure update, an approved migration path shall be provided when practical.

Critical security or safety risks may require restricted operation, network isolation, increased monitoring, accelerated migration, or withdrawal.

124. Final Building BIOS Model

The final System05 Building BIOS Model consists of a trusted local coordination layer positioned between the physical building and higher-level digital systems.

Its authoritative core contains:

persistent Building Identity;

Root of Trust;

Building Manifest;

Component Registry;

Cartridge Registry;

Interface Registry;

Spatial Registry;

Capability Registry;

Building Topology Graph;

Interface Connection Map;

Dependency Map;

Engineering Profile Configuration;

Configuration Baselines;

State and Event Engines;

Policy and Rules Engine;

Service Manager;

backup and recovery system.

The complete BIOS lifecycle follows this sequence:

Provision Establish building identity, trust, authority, software, and recovery credentials.

Configure Load the Building Manifest, Profiles, expected topology, and approved component definitions.

Install Place and connect BIOS hardware and supporting infrastructure.

Boot Securely Verify hardware, software, configuration, and essential services.

Discover Identify Components, Cartridges, Interfaces, and services present in the building.

Authenticate Verify identities and trust relationships.

Register Admit authorized entities into the building configuration.

Verify Compatibility Evaluate Interfaces, capabilities, versions, dependencies, and Profiles.

Construct Topology Establish physical, structural, utility, communication, control, spatial, and dependency relationships.

Validate Configuration Determine whether the complete configuration is consistent, compliant, and safe for the intended mode.

Commission Test actual installed behavior and create verified evidence.

Activate Assign limited permissions and authorize operational participation.

Coordinate Operation Maintain states, events, resources, authority, commands, faults, and operating modes.

Protect Enforce trust, authorization, segmentation, fail-safe behavior, fault containment, and emergency priorities.

Integrate Provide controlled access to Digital Twins, Engineering Compiler, AI, BMS, home automation, robots, edge services, and emergency responders.

Monitor and Maintain Preserve health, diagnostics, evidence, backups, credentials, and supportability.

Change and Upgrade Apply transactional configuration and software changes with validation and recovery.

Expand and Reconcile incorporate physical modifications while preserving traceability between design, installed condition, and active configuration.

Recover Restore trusted authority after hardware failure, cyberattack, corruption, or disaster.

Migrate or Decommission Transfer building authority to future hardware and software without losing identity, configuration, or lifecycle history.

The Building BIOS shall not be the intelligence that decides every aspect of building operation. It shall be the trusted foundation that tells every authorized system what the building contains, how its parts are related, what state they are in, what actions are permitted, and what evidence supports those conclusions.

The Building BIOS transforms a collection of physical products and disconnected software into a coherent, identifiable, configurable, recoverable, and continuously evolvable engineering platform.